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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the roots and evolution of 
the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and the circumstances that 
have shaped Australian maritime policy since WWII.  Its 
primary purpose is to provide present day policy experts 
with historical insights useful to the planning of future 
relationships with Australia and her Royal Navy.  In 
essence, this topic’s intent is to assist in the 
formulation of United States maritime policies that will 
achieve optimal global results through the thoughtful 
engagement and proper support of Southeast Asia’s 
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During the last half of the twentieth century, The 
Royal Australian Navy (RAN) played an increasingly 
important role in ensuring stability in Southeast Asia 
(SEA).  The RAN waged war alongside the United States Navy 
(USN) in Korea and Vietnam and now stands with the USN in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  Australia’s Royal Navy is a 
professional and proficient force, a fact that sets it 
apart from most of its regional neighbors.  However, its 
forces, which are smaller in size than those of many of its 
neighbors, are tasked with protecting the approaches of the 
only continental maritime nation which is dependent on 
seaborne trade for its welfare and prosperity.  Awareness 
of the circumstances and constraints faced by the RAN over 
the years, as well as an understanding of its efforts to 
maximize its capabilities during the current era of rapid 
global change, is essential when considering future 
collaborations with this valued naval ally in a service, 
joint or coalition role.   
An analysis of three sets of literature helps frame 
the issues that have determined the RAN’s evolution and 
proves valuable in forecasting how the RAN will be shaped 
in the future.  These are: (1) Australian diplomatic 
history; (2) Australian military history; and (3) 
Australian economic policy and military capacity.  It is 
more useful to examine how these literatures flow together 
and interact than to discuss them individually, since each 
focuses more or less exclusively on the characteristics 
associated with its particular field of research.  Economic 
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and diplomatic histories, for example, may not mention the 
Navy at all, while military histories tend to gloss over 
diplomatic and economic events.  Examining the literatures 
of a time period together rather than separately gives the 
researcher a broader and deeper view of how the events and 
circumstances of each field worked in concert to shape the 
RAN. 
Following World War II, the Australian government 
sought to safeguard its national security through an 
alignment shift from the United Kingdom to the United 
States.1  Correct interpretation of the relationship between 
the two superpowers (one rising and one declining) and 
their island nation cousin is important to achieving an 
understanding of both Canberra’s and the RAN’s frames of 
reference.  The bipolar world of the Cold War largely 
dictated how Australia would fit into the new regional and 
global construct.  Early writings, especially those of Sir 
Percy Spendor2, indicate the increasingly urgent need for 
Australia to form strong maritime and diplomatic 
relationships in opposition to the growing threat of the 
                     1 The evolution and importance of this relationship is variously discussed 
in works published between the 1950s and the 1990s.  Notably: Henry S Albinski, 
ANZUS, The United States and Pacific Security, (University Press of America, 
Lanham, 1987); Richard W Baker, ed, Australia, New Zealand and the United 
States: Internal Change and Alliance Relations in the ANZUS States, (Preager 
Publishers, Westport 1991); Richard W Baker, ed, The ANZUS States and Their 
Region:  Regional Policies of Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 
(Preager Publishers, Westport 1994); Glen St. James Barclay and Joseph M 
Siracusa, Australian-American Relations Since 1945, (Holt, Reinhardt and 
Winston, NSW, 1976); Jacob Bercovich, ed, ANZUS in Crisis:  Alliance Management 
in International Affairs, (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1988); Norman D 
Harper, Australia and the United States, (Thomas Nelson, Melbourne, 1971); 
Trevor R Reese, Australia, New Zealand and the United States:  A Survey of 
International Relations 1941-1968, (Oxford University Press, London, 1969); Sir 
Percy Spendor, Exercises in Diplomacy:  The ANZUS Treaty and the Columbo Plan, 
(Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1969); J. G. Starke, The ANZUS Treaty 
Alliance, (Melbourne University Press, Victoria, 1965).  
2 Sir Percy Spendor, Exercises in Diplomacy:  The ANZUS Treaty and 
the Columbo Plan, (Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1969). 
 xiii
Soviet Union.  Canberra increasingly aligned with the 
United States to maximize its influence through ANZUS and 
subsequently SEATO.  This alignment naturally extended to 
the RAN as new naval acquisition programs came online 
throughout the Cold War.3  The procurement of platforms and 
arms from the United States was of paramount importance.4   
This new strategic relationship was not one in which 
the two allies always reached harmonious accord.  
Disagreements over geopolitical issues in French Indochina, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan and during the aftermath of the 
Vietnam War all had a significant impact on the nature of 
the relationship and the closeness of the alliance.5 
Strong national security was important not only to 
protect Australia from the Soviet menace, but also to guard 
against sub-regional threats.  Expanding communism in the 
newly decolonized countries of Southeast Asia was a great 
concern; and Britain’s slow withdrawal from Southeast Asia 
did not merit full-time attention from Washington, who made 
                     3 This evolution is detailed in the official history of the RAN and 
other private works: Peter G Edwards, Crises and Commitments: The 
Politics and Diplomacy of Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian 
Conflicts 1948-1965, (Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards, 1992); Peter C 
Firkens, Of Nautilus and Eagles, (Hutchinson of Australia, Victoria, 
1983); T. R Frame, James V. P Goldrick, and P. D Jones, eds, 
Reflections on the RAN, (Kangaroo Press, 1991); David Stevens, ed, 
Maritime Power in the Twentieth Century:  The Australian Experience, 
(Allen and Unwin, St. Leonards, 1998); David Stevens, ed, The Royal 
Australian Navy (Oxford University Press, S. Melbourne, 2001). 
4 The first signs of this shift were published publicly in 1957.  Refer: 
NYT, April 5, 1957, 5:3. 
5 Good references for these issues:  Dept of State telegram, DULTE 48, May 
3, 1954, accessed via the Declassified Documents Reference System, Dudley Knox 
Library, Naval Postgraduate School; United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations website (www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unsfbackgr.html) 
accessed 05 Dec 2005; Australian Government Dept. of External Affairs, 
Current Notes on International Affairs, 33, no. 5, (1962), 5-7 cited in J. G 
Starke, The ANZUS Treaty Alliance, (Melbourne University Press, Victoria, 
1965); Alex Tewes, Laura Rayner, and Kelly Kavanaugh, Australia's Maritime 
Strategy in the 21st Century, (Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Section, 
Australian Parliament: 2004). 
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it clear on numerous occasions and across multiple 
administrations that Australia should deal with regional 
crises not vital to the national interests of the United 
States.  This position was allowable within the framework 
of both ANZUS and SEATO, and the Australian government 
itself made similar assertions regarding what comprised the 
“Pacific area.”6   
The policy framework of alignment with the United 
States remains in place today, and Australia’s outstanding 
performance as a primary ally in the GWOT is evidence of 
the fact that her national interests continue to overlap 
extensively with those of the United States.  Historically, 
the result of this strategic foundation, as it relates to 
the RAN, was the creation of a naval force designed to 
carry out two distinct missions.  The first mission was to 
defend the Australian homeland from direct, non-Soviet 
threats; the second was to integrate with and support the 
United States during the Cold War.  The second mission 
should be viewed as an extension of the first. 
Economic policies and domestic military capacities 
also played a critical role in determining how the RAN 
evolved.  Managing the construction, training and manning 
of successive generations of fleets to accomplish the 
above-mentioned maritime missions have posed significant 
challenges for RAN leadership.  The RAN’s primary 
historical constraints include: (1) economic limitations; 
(2) military-industrial complex limitations; (3) inter- 
 
 
                     6 The term repeatedly used in the ANZUS Treaty to lay the boundaries of 
mutual coordination, cooperation, defense, and consultation. 
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service rivalry/joint integration issues; and more recently 
(4) Canberra’s increasingly effective use of “soft power” 
to conduct foreign policy. 
Economic scarcity helped insure the success of the 
ANZUS alliance, but it also had the effect of restricting 
spending on naval production.  Australia’s naval budget 
remained more or less constant throughout the Cold War, 
during which time the percentage of Australia’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) earmarked for naval spending was 
paltry compared to the fiscal outlays of the British and 
the Americans. 7   
The relatively small population of Australia has also 
restricted the size and shape of the RAN.  Even though the 
nation’s population has grown threefold between 1946 and 
today, it’s military recruiting pool remains small in view 
of the large area that the RAN must defend.  Additionally, 
the need for human capital to drive Australia’s economy has 
historically been substantial, further depleting the 
prospective recruiting pool.8  
An additional factor shaping the RAN has been the 
Australian military-industrial complex’s lack of support 
for the building of ships larger than modern-day frigates 
and destroyers.9  The production of each new generation of 
complex surface ships and aircraft was time-consuming; and 
                     7 Eric J. Grove, “Advice and Assistance to a very independent people at a 
most crucial point: the British Admiralty and the future of the RAN 1958-60,” 
in David Stevens, ed, Maritime Power in the Twentieth Century: The Australian 
Experience, (Allen and Unwin, NSW, 1998), 138; NYT, May 5, 1954, 10:5. 
8 Covered briefly in David Stevens, ed, The Royal Australian Navy, (Oxford 
University Press, S. Melbourne, 2001).  Historical trend in labor shortages 
discusses in: Jonathan J. Pincus, “Government” in Rodney Maddock, and Ian W. 
McLean, eds, The Australian Economy in the Long Run, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987). 
9 Covered in Naval histories listed in footnote 3. 
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most of the technology since the advent of missiles and 
microprocessors, as well as the necessary designs and 
expertise, has come from the United States (with the 
exception of submarines).10  Prior to that time, technology 
and know-how had been provided by the British Admiralty.  
Because of these factors, investing in the military served 
only to protect Australia, rather than stimulate economic 
growth within the country, resulting additional incentive 
to minimize defense expenditures. 
The natural outgrowth of Australia’s minimal 
expenditures on national defense was inter-service 
competition for funds.  An example of this rivalry was the 
fiscal battle between the RAN and the Royal Australian Air 
Force (RAAF) over the Fleet Air Arm that began in the 
1950s.  The two forces came to budgetary blows again 
following the Vietnam War and the collapse of SEATO, an 
event that helped sound the death knell for carrier fixed 
wing aviation and ushered in a more joint maritime strategy 
focusing on “Continentalism.”  Canberra shifted its focus 
to a strategy of “Self Reliance,” rather than that of 
“Forward Defense” in coordination with the United States.11  
The vigorous debate between the services over the Fleet Air 
Arm was not unlike America’s “revolt of the Admirals” in 
concept, although not in action.  It was an attempt by each 
service to construct a new maritime strategy to its own 
advantage. 
                     10 Covered in Naval histories listed in footnote 3.  Also: Jeffery Grey, Up 
Top:  The Royal Australian Navy and Southeast Asian Conflicts 1955-1972, (Allen 
and Unwin, St. Leonards, 1998), 17; Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter, Sep 2005, 6-
8. 
11 Although covered in varying degrees in the historical texts, a very good 
comparison and explanation is offered in Laura Rayner and Kelly Kavanaugh, 
Australia's Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century (Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade Section, Australian Parliament: 2004). 
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In the future, the mission of the RAN may slightly 
increase in scope through the addition of new missions.  
For example, addition of a small amount of modern 
amphibious expeditionary lift will greatly increase the 
effectiveness of the RAN in dealing with small regional 
crises and in supporting the GWOT in SEA.12  The idea of 
this new RAN resource to may even be met favorably by its 
sister services, since the addition will enhance their own 
capabilities as well.  However, this new capability may 
come at the cost of the traditional role of defending the 
homeland, putting it at loggerheads with a mainstay of 
Australian military planning.  Given these constraints, the 
RAN will not be able to increase its military power 
substantially in relation to that of other middle power 
navies, let alone to face down a regionally hegemonic 
maritime power. 
Canberra clearly recognizes that “soft power,” as Nye 
discusses,13 is the key to future success in the region. 
This fact is primarily attributable to the end of the Cold 
War and the rapidly increasing globalization of both 
economies and information.  Complementary, low cost and 
perceived as low risk, the use of soft power has become an 
important tool in Australian foreign policy actions given 
the significant alliance setbacks suffered by the British 
withdrawal east of the Suez, the creation the European 
Union, the Nixon Doctrine, the rise of newly independent 
                     12 Australian Government, Dept. of Defense, 2006-2016 Defense Capability 
Plan (Public Version) accessed at 
<http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/id/dcp/DCP_2006_16.pdf> on 23 Feb 2007. 
13 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, (Perseus 
Publishing, New York: 2004), Ch. 4. 
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countries in the area, and both China’s and India’s 
continued rise as a regional power in East Asia.   
China is seen as the most significant challenger in 
the region, and a survey of Australia’s growing economic, 
political and social ties with the increasingly powerful 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) supports this premise.  It 
is simply not in Australia’s national interest to move 
toward military confrontation with Beijing.  Observers 
might theorize that Australia is merely following the lead 
of the United States in ensuring the peaceful rise, or 
successful containment, of China.  This shared direction is 
indeed happy coincidence, but it should be noted that 
Canberra opposes using ANZUS in support of a United States 
application of force in the Taiwan Strait and also that 
Australia initiated diplomatic and economic relations with 
the PRC at a pace that left the United States looking 
lethargic.   
Effective use of soft power decreases the need for a 
large naval force presence, SLOC protection or amphibious 
assault, thereby limiting the need for a larger, more 
potent navy in relation to other regional states or middle 
powers outside the region.  Canberra uses soft power to 
obtain what its military cannot, while also hedging against 
a possible future U.S. power vacuum.  If the USN were to 
withdraw from East Asia, it is highly unlikely that 
Canberra would, or could, produce a true blue water power 
projection fleet.   
While American resolve to remain militarily engaged in 
the region is not likely to wane for the foreseeable 
future, current events in the Global War on Terrorism may 
 xix
foreshadow political and social fallout in Australia, 
notably over Iraq and Afghanistan, which could produce 
unfavorable changes in the current maritime strategy and 
therefore the RAN’s future modernization.  In the absence 
of a traditional threat, the Australian government might 
simply increase its reliance on the use of soft power and 
return to focusing on protection of the homeland and its 
approaches from asymmetric attack.  In this scenario, 
Canberra would use multi-lateral peacekeeping and stability 
operations along with limited anti-access and strike 
warfare techniques close to home, but would be less willing 
to risk the lives of its military members or to expend 
significant resources for Washington’s vision of the Global 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Navies exist solely to exercise their nations’ 
policies at sea; their forces operate within the guidance 
and constraints dictated by their governments.  Over the 
course of a maritime nation’s history, radical changes 
occur in the platforms, technology, personal skill levels, 
and missions for which its navy was developed.  These 
changes are not made for the sake of change alone, but are 
instead the result of deliberate decisions that mandate 
alterations in key characteristics of the service.  The 
specifics of such decisions are the result of consultation 
between naval and civilian leadership and are firmly rooted 
in pre-existing governmental policy.  In essence, and 
within the constraints imposed by existing force structure, 
which in the nature of things can only change slowly, 
determinations are made that continually reconstruct the 
navy in the image that most closely suits the national 
interest at that particular time. 
The foundation for the modern RAN was laid following 
World War II.  The considerations that shaped that 
foundation have continued to exert influence over the years 
that have followed.  The shape of the RAN was then, and 
remains today, dependent on the Australian government’s 
interpretation of internal and external factors as they 
relate to the nation’s vital interests and national policy 
decisions.  Without a working knowledge of how these 
factors affected the shape of the RAN, the United States 
will be unable to understand the changes underway in the 
Australian Navy today.   
2 
This thesis seeks to analyze the development of the 
RAN by means of a series of historical case studies which 
highlight the major forces and episodes that have 
progressively altered its missions and structure since its 
founding over half a century ago.  These “snapshots” will 
examine the factors that set the Royal Navy’s foundations, 
identify and analyze significant turning points in its 
evolution, and detail the most dramatic developments in its 
nature and composition.  The periods that will be described 
are: (1) the years between Korea and Vietnam, (2) the post-
Vietnam era up to the decommissioning of the RAN carrier, 
and (3) the end of the Cold War to the present.  A chapter 
is also dedicated to discussion of Australia’s current 
preference for the use of soft power over the option of 
military might, a strategy designed to curb accelerating 
military expenditures while hedging against the rising 
power of the PRC.  This relatively recent policy direction 
has assumed increasing prominence over the past ten years.    
Primary sources consist of official government 
publications and documents of both Australia and the United 
States.  The investigation will also include interviews and 
statements from public and military officials.   
Secondary sources include the works of researchers, 
historians and others who have documented the circumstances 
responsible for the evolution of the RAN.  Cited material 
will include historical, diplomatic and economic writings. 
Other sources include journals, periodicals, 
newspapers, websites and other open source materials that 
highlight Australia’s use of soft power, particularly in 
relation to the time period between the end of the Cold War 
and the aftermath of 9/11. 
3 
II. ESTABLISHING NEW ROOTS: THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN 
NAVY BETWEEN KOREA AND VIETNAM 
Between 1953 and 1964, significant military and 
diplomatic events decidedly shaped the course of the Royal 
Australian Navy (RAN).  Over little more than a decade, the 
RAN became the pre-eminent sea power among the countries of 
Southeast Asia (SEA).  Geopolitical events in SEA between 
the end of the Korean War and the escalation of the Vietnam 
War provided the impetus needed to maintain and often 
expand RAN force capabilities and training levels, 
transforming the service into the dominant navy in the 
region as the British slowly disengaged from the area and 
as the United States became less able to play a full time 
role.  The resulting need for a strong and active navy 
overcame Canberra’s desire to limit military spending 
following the Korean War and even surmounted inter-service 
mission competition, particularly with the Royal Australian 
Air Force (RAAF), for those limited funds.  
Throughout the period, both RAN and the Australian 
government learned to better understand the strategic 
framework and limitations of Australia’s alliances.  
Additionally, as Australia recognized that their ability to 
act independently was important to the preservation of the 
nation’s vital interests, the need for a strong, diverse, 
regional navy became increasingly evident.  Australia 
developed the ability to successfully engage allies on 
items of mutual benefit, while also acting independently in 
the region. 
 The genesis for Australian maritime power can be found 
in three specific diplomatic initiatives:  The Australia, 
New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS), the 
4 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and its associated 
security treaty (SEATO) and the Australia, New Zealand and 
Malaya area agreement (ANZAM). 
 ANZAM was conceived in 1950 in response to the Malayan 
Emergency, a long period of communist guerrilla actions 
which began in June 1948 and ended in July 1960.  Through 
ANZAM, Britain hoped to stabilize the Malayan area by 
unifying her former colonies, including the newly formed 
Federation of Malaysia.  An additional tangible effect of 
ANZAM for the Australians was that during war, the ANZAM 
organization would be administered by the Australian 
Defense Committee.  Eventually the Far East Strategic 
Reserve (FESR) was formed in 1955, showing continued 
British and Commonwealth resolve in the area and supporting 
the newly created SEATO alliance. The FESR formalized the 
deployment and integration of British, Australian, and New 
Zealand military forces to the ANZAM area, in effect 
transforming ANZAM’s ad hoc agreement into a standing 
military force.   
ANZUS, signed in 1951, allowed Australia to align with 
the United States for protection.  A defensive alliance, it 
was originally a guarantor of protection against a 
remilitarized Japan.  However, in reference to the context 
in which history would unfold, it is important to note that 
on both sides of the Pacific, the treaty was soon viewed as 
an alliance for protection against the encroachment of 
communism.  In Australia, for example, at the same time 
that the ANZUS treaty was signed, the Australian Parliament 
passed a bill to contain the Communist Party.  The spread 
of “red nationalism” would quickly dominate the alliance 
and its actions.  Although ANZUS was never intended to 
include a NATO-like standing military structure, it did 
5 
allow for direct consultations during crises and stipulated 
that the alliance applied to territorial threats, a proviso 
which would become important after Indonesia took control 
of West New Guinea from the Dutch. 
SEATO, formed in 1955, was expressly dedicated to the 
containment of communism.  This was explicitly put into a 
written addendum added by the United States, whose purpose 
was to avoid being pulled into small regional conflicts.  
SEATO’s defensive security pact was the vehicle by which 
the ANZUS agenda was executed.  ANZUS remained important to 
the Australians because it provided a unique and close 
forum in which the Western allies could conference 
separately and also at higher levels of classification.  
For example, ANZUS allowed the Americans to share nuclear 
defense information with the Australians which would not be 
made available to other allies.14 
After the Korean War ended in mid-1953, Canberra began 
to question the wisdom of continued defense spending, 
especially for naval expenditures.  This was not due to a 
change in government, as the conservative Liberal-Country 
Party had been in power since 1949 and would remain so 
until 1972; Robert Menzies served as Prime Minister 
continuously from 1949 to 1966.  Rather, other factors 
drove this developing problem for the RAN.  Modernization 
of the fleet, especially the two aircraft carriers and 
their air wings, would be exceptionally difficult and 
expensive.  Australia’s carriers, Sydney and Melbourne, 
were purchased shortly after World War II from Britain’s 
excess pre-commissioned inventory.  Certain modernizations 
were completed, including a steam catapult and angled deck 
on Melbourne.  Work on both carriers was significantly                      14 NYT, July 13, 1957, 18:2. 
6 
delayed in the yards and only Sydney was ready in time to 
support the Korean campaign.  At delivery, both carriers 
and their air wings were already outdated and the ships 
were unable to handle the modern jet aircraft that the 
British and Americans were starting to field. 
The same factors held true for the rest of the navy.  
The RAN combatant force was small, old, and outdated.  It 
was not suitable to support modern weapons systems or 
command suites, and inadequate to support the protection of 
high value units from attack by modern weapons.  The 
minesweepers were aging and insufficient in quantity, while 
the patrol force was almost non-existent. 
The diplomatic successes represented by ANZAM, ANZUS 
and SEATO also factored into downplaying the importance of 
having a well-rounded navy.  The RAN’s official position 
proposed maintaining and modernizing the two carriers and 
building up the combatant forces to protect them.  However, 
the government deemed this to be economically unfeasible, 
asserting that defense spending had to be brought under 
control since it had grown dramatically since the end of 
World War II.15 
In 1959, prior to the Australian Chief of Naval 
Staff’s visit to London to discuss strategy and future 
procurement, the Admiralty’s Plans Division internal 
briefing summarized the Australian problem quite 
succinctly: 
…being girt by sea and having no inland frontiers 
to protect, Australia is compelled to regard the 
sea itself as the first and last line of 
defense….a fact which successive Australian 
governments and the Australian people have failed 
to acknowledge and it is the reason why they only 
                     15 NYT, May 5, 1954, 10:5. 
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allocate one quarter the percentage of their 
gross national product to their navy as compared 
to the percentage the Royal Navy receives.16  
However, Prime Minister Menzies believed that the best 
way for Australia to support her more powerful allies would 
be to maintain a robust economy, which meant keeping 
defense spending under control.17   
The RAAF also made strong appeals for funding which 
were not unlike those put forth by the U.S. Air Force at 
about the same time.  The RAAF, supporters argued, should 
invest heavily in technological advances and force upgrade.  
According to RAAF proponents, the air force would then 
guarantee the defense of the island nation and execute any 
mission the navy and her fleet air arm could, for less cost 
and less loss of material.  The fallacies of this argument 
will not be lost on modern military analysts.  The RAN 
attempted to demonstrate that the RAAF did not have the 
reach or capacity to support over sea missions like anti-
submarine warfare or continuous anti-ship patrol, nor to 
ensure air power projection capability anywhere in the 
region, as only the carrier battle group could.  However, 
the argument contributed ammunition to the negative debate 
surrounding the future of the navy, especially at a time of 
decreasing defense budgets. 
By 1958 many experts, most from outside the RAN and 
including the British Admiralty, suggested that the navy 
focus only on missions in which the Australians could 
provide support to the British and Americans as primary 
allies to these larger powers.  Possible missions in this 
                     16 Eric J. Grove, “Advice and Assistance to a very independent people at a 
most crucial point: the British Admiralty and the future of the RAN 1958-60,” 
in David Stevens, ed, Maritime Power in the Twentieth Century: The Australian 
Experience, (Allen and Unwin, NSW, 1998), 138. 
17 NYT, May 5, 1954, 10:5. 
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scenario were seen as coastal defense, minesweeping, 
frigate escort for the transports and high value units of 
the allies, and anti-submarine warfare (ASW).  ASW was 
particularly important at that time because Soviet 
submarines had recently become very active in the Pacific. 
Initially, a decision was made to disband the fleet air arm 
and decommission the carriers (Melbourne was still active, 
but Sydney had already become a training ship).  However, 
within a few months, the decision to scrap Melbourne and 
the fleet air arm was rescinded.  Given the growing 
importance of the ASW mission, the decision was made to 
turn the fleet air arm into a rotary wing surface that 
could prosecute submarines.  Again, however, the cost 
associated with maintaining or modernizing the fixed wing 
air defense, strike and ASW capability was deemed not cost 
effective.18 
The navy’s emergence as a fully mission-capable entity 
was limited by a variety of considerations.  The first real 
restraint was that the United States wished to be 
recognized as the dominant power throughout the Pacific 
Rim. The sun was continuing to set on the British Empire, 
and Australian-American ties, which had emerged even before 
1945, had continued to grow long before the Suez Doctrine 
of 1969, which announced the formal withdrawal of the 
remaining British forces stationed in the region and the 
closing of the naval base in Singapore.  Australian defense 
acquisition changed dramatically in 1957, when Prime 
Minister Menzies announced: 
 
                     18 Eric J. Grove, “Advice and Assistance to a very independent people at a 
most crucial point: the British Admiralty and the future of the RAN 1958-60,” 
in Davis Stevens’ book, Maritime Power in the Twentieth Century: The Australian 
Experience, (Allen and Unwin, NSW, 1998), 135-155. 
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Common sense dictates that in these 
circumstances we should pay considerable 
attention to the logistic aspect of war and 
standardize, so far as we can, with the 
Americans.  Though this is whole-heartedly a 
British nation, this policy isn’t heresy—it 
merely recognizes the facts of war.19 
The slow withdrawal of Britain from Southeast Asia 
meant that only the United States could be relied upon to 
come to Australia’s aid in the future.  Australia 
recognized that America was a powerful ally and knew that 
the Yanks and Aussies would almost certainly be fighting 
side by side during any major regional or world conflict.  
However, the American preoccupation with the communist 
threat emanating from the Soviet Union meant that it could 
not be expected to provide support to smaller regional 
disputes. Three examples support this statement. 
The first example is the “United Action” plan of 1954, 
in which Washington sought an ad hoc alliance with Paris, 
London, Canberra, and Wellington to relieve the French 
garrison under siege at Dien Bien Phu.  In this situation, 
the Australians were caught in the power vacuum between the 
Americans and the British, who did not support the 
initiative.  Australia saw it in their best interest to 
support the Americans but still had close ties to the 
British and also had a Parliamentary election pending; 
Canberra was forced to officially support the British 
position.20  The idea of “United Action” never got off the 
ground.  The concept was not important enough to Washington 
for the U.S. to implement without the support of her major 
ally, Great Britain.                      19 NYT, April 5, 1957, 5:3. 
20 Dept of State telegram, DULTE 48, May 3, 1954, accessed via the 
Declassified Documents Reference System, Dudley Knox Library, Naval 
Postgraduate School on 20 Feb 2006. 
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Secondly, the Indonesian-Dutch dispute over West New 
Guinea from 1961 to 1963 showed that the United States 
would not wholeheartedly back an issue the Australians 
viewed as vital to their national interest.  The 
Netherlands wanted to maintain control over its last 
possession in the West Indies until the area could govern 
itself, while the Indonesians argued that West New Guinea 
should be part of their nation.  The Dutch moral ground was 
that the inhabitants were a minority population which 
needed protection until able to live independently.  
Australia viewed Dutch control as vital to their national 
interest because the Indonesians were viewed as having 
communist sympathies, and West Irian was adjacent to 
Australia’s protectorates and only a few hundred miles from 
the Northern Territories.  However, the United States would 
not support the Dutch position and forced the issue into 
the United Nations for resolution.  The solution was for a 
United Nations police force to control the area for a year 
to ensure stability and then transition control to the 
Indonesian government.21   Washington’s answer to 
Australia’s security concerns was in the Eisenhower 
administration’s unequivocal statement that the ANZUS 
treaty would apply if Indonesia attacked the Australian 
territory of Papua and New Guinea.22   
The third example is the “Confrontation”.  In 1963, 
before the United Nations turnover of West New Guinea to 
Indonesia had taken place, the Indonesian-Malaysian 
Confrontation began.  This low level guerrilla-style 
                     21 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations website 
<www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unsfbackgr.html> accessed on 20 Feb 
2006. 
22 Australian Government Dept. of External Affairs, Current Notes on 
International Affairs, 33, no. 5, (1962), 5-7 cited in J. G Starke, The ANZUS 
Treaty Alliance, (Melbourne University Press, Victoria, 1965). 
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conflict dragged on until 1966, after the Australian 
involvement in Vietnam had escalated.  Units of the FESR 
were responsible for helping the Malaysian government 
defend its sovereignty.  The United States viewed this 
action as the responsibility of the parties affiliated with 
ANZAM and declined to intervene.  They also did not agree 
that an attack on Australian military personnel would 
invoke ANZUS.  Again, the signal was sent -- Australia must 
be prepared to act independently in certain crises. 
These events, which demonstrated Washington’s 
reluctance to involve itself heavily in Southeast Asia’s 
regional disputes, led Canberra to choose a more pragmatic 
course for the RAN.  Australia needed to protect its vital 
interests when the United States could not or would not.  
The Menzies government drew a clear line between the nature 
of the Cold War (or the GWOT that could escalate from it) 
and less significant regional conflicts.  Based on these 
real world decisions, the Royal Australian Navy set about 
conforming to the new strategic vision.  These actions were 
not taken all at once, but were cumulative between the mid-
1950s and mid-1960s. 
With the decision to discontinue fixed wing naval 
aviation, the navy determined to build air defense 
destroyers, which moved the navy into the missile age.  
Adams class destroyers designed and built in the United 
States were selected for several reasons.  The foremost 
reason for the selection was that the Adams class provided 
a better mission match than the County class destroyers 
proposed by the Admiralty.  The most attractive selling 
point was the Tarter missile system, for which the British 
had no equivalent.  Purchasing U.S. ships was more cost-
effective than performing the redesign necessary to 
12 
retrofit the British design to the American weapons system.  
The Adams class ships would also allow complete integration 
into the U. S. Navy supply system within which the vessels 
expected to operate.  The Americans were also more 
conducive to bargaining, and the salesmanship of the 
Americans was much more graceful. 
At that time, plans were also made to purchase new 
escort/ASW frigates or to upgrade existing ones.  The 
growing importance of ASW led the Aussies to purchase and 
operate their first submarines in 36 years.  A lengthy 
selection process resulted in the purchase of six Oberon 
class diesel boats from the United Kingdom; after lengthy 
discussion, the initial contract was finally signed in 
1967.  The boats were not American since the United States 
no longer built diesel boats and the RAN had no need for 
nuclear-powered attack submarines.  The purchase of the 
submarine force was made in anticipation of the withdrawal 
of the British submarine squadron stationed in Sydney.23 
The refocus on the littoral, especially after the 
Malayan Crisis and the Confrontation, persuaded the RAN to 
invest heavily in new minesweepers and patrol ships, some 
of which were indigenously produced.  During both conflicts 
the existing ships and their crews were stretched to the 
limit, because they were needed both as replacements and to 
decrease operating tempo. 
In a final re-evaluation of the need for a fully 
mission-capable navy, the fleet air arm was able to keep 
its fixed wing aviation, including the Gannet ASW aircraft 
and Sea Venom fighter.  In 1965, after several years of 
debate, the decision was made to upgrade to more modern 
                     23 Jeffery Grey, Up Top:  The Royal Australian Navy and Southeast Asian 
Conflicts 1955-1972, (Allen and Unwin, St. Leonards, 1998), 17. 
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aircraft that could operate on the small deck of the 
Melbourne.  The selected aircraft were American because of 
the nations’ close ties and the availability of airframes; 
A-4 Skyhawks and S-2E Trackers were picked up by Melbourne 
in the United States in 1967 and remained in service until 
Melbourne decommissioned in 1982.24  These aircraft were not 
the most modern but, combined with the correct training, 
were more than a match for any regional enemy. 
The combination of good training and fully operational 
equipment should not be underestimated.  Even at its 
reduced state of force levels, with fatigued and aging 
platforms, during the Confrontation the RAN was more than a 
match for the Indonesian navy, which was supplied some of 
the newest equipment the Soviets could offer, both in 
quality and quantity.  Despite their low levels of funding 
and continuous manpower constraints, the RAN made sure its 
people were trained and that equipment worked properly.  
The combination proved successful in ensuring the navy 
could meet all assigned missions, both in support of its 
allies and if called upon to act independently. 
The RAN also grew in regional prestige by maintaining 
a balanced force which could project itself in the region.  
This was proven not just during operations, but also 
through engagement with other nations, taking the form of 
traditional visits as well as participation in numerous 
exercises in the Pacific Rim through its alliance with 
SEATO.  Often, the RAN would staff and run the exercise 
since the USN was often unable to free up a carrier.  This 
provided RAN officers and crews with valuable integration 
as well as command and control experience.  Australia’s 
                     24 Australian Government Royal Australian Navy website 
<www.navy.gov.au/spc/history/ships/melbourne2.html> accessed on 3 Mar 2006. 
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navy gained the ability to plan and execute modern naval 
warfare, setting the stage for future generations of RAN 
alumni. 
Geopolitical events forced the Royal Australian Navy 
to become a regional maritime power.  Although the 
government initially did not foresee that occurrence, 
external influences overcame inter-service rivalry and 
domestic economic concerns.  The slow shift of power 
brought about by the eventual withdrawal of Great Britain 
as a power in the region, the continuous threat of 
communism, the rise of Indonesia, and the need to ally and 
integrate with the United States during the Cold War forced 
the government of Australia to expand and modernize its 
navy in order to protect its national interests. 
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III. NAVAL EVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF SELF-RELIANCE 
During the Vietnam War, the RAN performed extremely 
well in support of her superpower ally. Australia’s Navy 
contributed destroyer support to the gun line in South 
Vietnam as well as rotary wing assets and ordnance disposal 
units in support of the First Australian Task Force (1ATF) 
in Vietnam.25 In addition to casualties suffered inland 
while supporting the 1ATF, HMAS Hobart was struck by 
multiple Sea Sparrow missiles launched from a U.S. Air 
Force F-4 on patrol off the coast of Vietnam.26  This 
unfortunate friendly fire event demonstrated how dangerous 
modern air assets with precision guided weapons could be to 
ships-of-the-line. 
In contrast, the strategic assets of the RAN did not 
play a part in Southeast Asia’s escalating conflict.  
Submarines were of no use in a Third World land war, and 
the Melbourne was unable to come to American assistance 
early in the effort due to the refit and reequipping of the 
fixed wing assets that were being procured from the United 
States.   
Additionally, it was determined that Australia’s newly 
retrained A-4 pilots would be unable to integrate with the 
American command and control architecture and that the A-4 
in its stripped down, bare bones Australian form would be 
outmatched in the intense air defense environment which 
prominently featured some of the newest surface-to-air 
missiles in the Soviet inventory. 
                     25 David Stevens, The Royal Australian Navy part of The Australian Centenary 
History of Defense, (Vol III), (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 203-
208. 
26 Ibid., 206. 
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The British were in the final stages of the announced 
withdrawal of their forward deployed forces from Southeast 
Asia.  NATO defense obligations were the UK’s primary 
concern and were all the once great empire could now 
afford.  British intent was to leave a token force in place 
in Singapore and Malaysia, in coordination with her 
regional commonwealth allies.  Eventually called the Five 
Power Defense Agreement (FPDA), a new force structure 
called ANZUK was created.  Since only a small British naval 
force remained on station, the overall force level was 
significantly lower than that maintained as part of the Far 
East Strategic Reserve. The RAN contribution to this force 
was only a rotating surface ship and an occasional 
submarine deployed to the force in Singapore.27 
 Unfortunately for the RAN, the slogan “All the Way 
with LBJ”28 heralded the beginning of the end of the concept 
of political-military forward defense that had grown since 
the inception of ANZUS.  As the Vietnam era dragged to a 
close, Australia faced significant domestic challenges at 
home and a changing geo-strategic environment that 
drastically reshaped the foundations of Australia’s 
defense.  In turn, this affected the course of the RAN 
between the end of the Vietnam War and the early 1980’s, a 
period generally described by the politicians and 
strategists of the era as being the beginning of “Self-
Reliance”.  The time was marked by a more inwardly focused 
defense policy whose primary concern was the direct defense 
of Australia.  The first hints of this change had come by 
                     27 David Stevens, The Royal Australian Navy part of The Australian Centenary 
History of Defense, (Vol III), (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 212-
214. 
28 Michael Steketee, “All the Way at Full Steam,” in The Australian, 23 Nov 
2006, accessed at <www.news.com.au> on 10 Feb 2007. 
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the late 1960s during discussions in government circles 
that were held as Vietnam began to look more and more like 
a mistake.  In 1969, Australia decided that the time had 
come to announce that her troops would be pulled out of 
Vietnam at some time in the future.29  The concept was 
codified in the first Defense White paper of this new 
period, published in 1972. 
 As is common in democracies, unpopular wars lose 
elections.  In December 1972 Australia’s Labor Party, under 
Edward Whitlam, came to power for the first time in 23 
years.  One of the planks in the party’s platform was to 
institute a more independent foreign policy.  As a result a 
slight dip in defense spending occurred, along with a 
general downward trend in military procurement which would 
last until the mid-1970s.30   
 Even after the return to power of the Liberal-Country 
Party in 1975, the tenor of self-reliance was further 
amplified by the 1976 Defense White Paper’s phrase “to 
ensure that the Defense Force can be supported and 
maintained in Australia, utilizing for the provision of 
equipment and material, a combination of local industry, 
(and) selective and reliable overseas sources of supply.”31 
 Not only did the politicians “down under” view this as 
a new era in defense planning, the strategists, planners,  
 
                     29 1ATF withdrawal was initially announced in 1969 and was completed in 
1971. The RAN contributions to the American war effort ended this same year. 
30 Desmond J. Ball, “Equipment Policy for the Defense of Australia,” in 
Robert O’Neill, The Defense of Australia: Fundamental New Aspects, (Canberra: 
Australian National University, 1976), 99. 
31 Australia Department of Defense, 1976 Defense White Paper, quoted in L.G. 
Randell, “Australian Defense Industry,” in David Stevens, and D. M.Horner, eds, 
Australian Defense Policy for the 1980s, (St Lucia: University of Queensland 
Press, 1982), 232.  
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and analysts did as well.  The foreign policy genesis of 
this sentiment can be found in the 1969 Guam (or Nixon) 
Doctrine, which stipulated: 
 
--First, the United States will keep all of its 
treaty commitments. 
--Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear 
power threatens the freedom of a nation allied 
with us or of a nation whose survival we consider 
vital to our national security. 
--Third, in cases involving other types of 
aggression, we shall furnish military and 
economic assistance when requested in accordance 
with our treaty commitments.  But we shall look 
to the nation directly threatened to assume the 
primary responsibility of providing the manpower 
for its defense.32 
 
In hindsight, this would appear to be the restatement 
of an already articulated point of view that had been made 
repeatedly during the early years of the ANZUS alliance.  
However, a survey of the period material indicates that at 
the time, the idea of Washington not playing an active role 
in all aspects of the ANZUS region, particularly in 
Australia’s “neck of the woods,” was considered not only 
important, but entirely new.  This is a particularly 
interesting given the number of times Washington refused to 
support Canberra on significant issues in the 1950s.  In 
this case it appears that historiography may not match 
actual history. 
The RAN, however, seems to have seen the world from 
the 1950’s perspective as they put forward an aggressive                      32 United States, Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States, 1969, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1971), 905.  This speech was presented by President Nixon to the nation on Nov. 
3, 1969 and amplifies his initial remarks made during a brief stop in Guam on 
Jul. 25, 1969. 
19 
procurement plan in 1973, one that included the desire to 
obtain “two small aircraft carriers, which the navy termed 
seaborne aircraft platforms, eight submarines, seventeen 
destroyers, one amphibious helicopter assault ship, one 
amphibious transport, two maintenance ships, and ten patrol 
boats.”33  The navy still clearly saw itself as a highly 
mobile force capable of both defending the homeland and 
projecting force in the region as necessary.  However, this 
plan was in shoal waters even at the time of its 
announcement. 
The American ground force withdrawal from Southeast 
Asia and the Guam Doctrine prompted a restructuring of the 
Australian Defense Force (ADF) in line with the emerging 
strategy of Self Reliance.  Under defense reforms made 
between 1973 and 1975, the services were unified into the 
newly created Department of Defense.34  This established 
greater civilian control over all the uniformed services 
and moved the Navy into a position of supporting the 
establishment of a unified military strategy.  Previously, 
as an individual service, the Navy had the freedom to 
determine appropriate naval strategy and the necessary 
procurement of forces, and also had direct liaison and 
integration with foreign navies to implement that strategy.  
This sense of individuality existed in all the services, 
tracing its roots to the time of Federation when each 
national service was required to meet the wartime needs of 
the British Empire.  As described in the previous chapter, 
                     33 David Stevens, The Royal Australian Navy part of The Australian Centenary 
History of Defense (Vol III), (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 216. 
34 A good summary, among many, is W. L. Morrison, “The Role of the Minister 
in the Making of Australian Defense Policy Since the Reorganization of the 
Department of Defence,” in Robert O’Neill, The Defense of Australia: 
Fundamental New Aspects, (Canberra: Australian National University, 1976), 71-
87. 
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naval decisions were neither made in a vacuum, nor without 
the sea service being required to justify its position to 
the government.  However, the formation of a unified 
defense establishment, composed of both military and 
civilian entities which had both strategic and budgetary 
control, largely removed decision-making from the hands of 
the RAN and its token Minister of the Navy.  Prior to this 
reform, Navy Admirals had exerted significant control over 
even the Minister.  As a result, naval developments 
essentially went directly to the cabinet level.   
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Navy’s primary 
goal was to align with the hegemonic power rather than to 
integrate with the other Australian services.  The new 
strategy, in combination with the new unified services 
organization, often put the Navy at odds both with the 
other services and with the Minster of Defense, who 
submitted recommendations to the cabinet for each year’s 
defense vote.   
The unified services reform also created the position 
of Chief of the Defense Force Staff (CDFS), who had direct 
access to both the Defense Minister and the Prime Minister.  
Service parochialism and exclusion of naval concepts could 
easily be construed as a possible weakness of this new 
joint architecture.  This is not to say that a CDFS from a 
different service branch would not be impartial, but the 
Navy certainly would feel more at ease when one of their 
own was at the helm of the defense staff during the early 
years of being a “joint” service. 
Given the failure of hard power in Vietnam, the RAN 
also faced increased budgetary constraints as political 
will bent more toward the use of soft power.  Parliament’s 
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upper house strongly endorsed this idea in 1976.  In 
summarizing the role of the country in its region, the 
emphasis and first recommendation was placed on “political, 
diplomatic, trade, aid, and cultural initiatives to ensure 
the peaceful development and stability of the region.” 35 
Perceived direct threat to Australia was also low in 
the 1970s.  The continuously expressed estimate was that 
any regional threat to Australia was 10-15 years away.36  It 
was easy to agree that only the United States and Soviet 
Union could pose a direct threat to the Australian 
continent in a conventional war, and that the chance of 
nuclear war was remote given the current parity and 
retaliatory capability between the superpowers.  
Australia was entering what today we would call 
“capabilities-based planning.”  In a brief 1993 essay, 
author Thomas-Durell Young referred to the process as 
“Threat-Ambiguous Defense Planning.”  Young encouraged the 
U.S. military to examine the Australian experience for 
lessons learned as the post-Cold War world unfolded.37  The 
RAN struggled with the new concept, one that ultimately 
would impact the number of capital ships and missions 
performed by the RAN. 
This new threat re-assessment signaled the belief that 
wielding soft power was less expensive then military 
aggression and also fit more appropriately into Southeast 
Asia’s emerging geo-political situation.  As Washington and                      35 Australia Parliament, Australia and the Indian Ocean Region, (Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Office, 1976), 203.  Similar assertions are 
made in the 1976 Defense White Paper.  
36 Noted in the 1972 and 1976 Defense White Papers, 1971 Report of the Joint 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and various other comments by members of the 
cabinet-level. 
37 Thomas-Durell Young, Threat Ambiguous Defense Planning: The Australian 
Experience, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U. S. Army War College, 1993). 
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Moscow moved into the period of détente during the 1970s, 
the threat of Soviet expansion was seen as diminishing.  
Also, the actions of communist insurgencies were seen in a 
different light.  No longer thought to be dominoes falling 
to the will of the Soviets or Chinese, these insurgents 
were viewed more as nationalist movements independent of 
extreme outside influence.  By the mid-1970s, while the 
loss of South Vietnam and the invasion of Cambodia were not 
irrelevant to Australian foreign policy, they were no 
longer viewed as immediate threats to national interests, 
as their prospect had been in the mid-1960s.  Canberra had 
been enlightened by the knowledge that diplomatic and 
economic influence could play a more moderate and positive 
role in the region. 
The insurgent and conventional military threat posed 
by Indonesia had also drastically changed since 1965, when 
a military coup removed President Sukarno from power.  By 
1966 Indonesia’s close ties with the PRC were severed and 
the back of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) broken, 
circumstances that allowed the United States and her 
Pacific allies, including Australia, to enact a myriad of 
measures aimed at opening Indonesia to the West.38  
Australia’s contribution to Indonesia during this time was 
not insignificant.  In addition to providing substantial 
economic aid and investment, foreign military sales and 
training during this period included Nomad short takeoff  
 
                     38 See Richard Brabin-Smith, Australia’s International Relationships with 
the United States, Indonesia and New Zealand, (Canberra: Australian National 
University, 2006), 14-15; Nancy Viviani, “The Sharp Deterioration in Relations 
Between Indonesia and Australia,” in Chris Manning and Peter Van Dierman, eds, 
Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis, (London: Zed, 
2000), 123; and John Perkins, Confessions of an Economic Hitman, (San 
Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers,2004), 20-28. 
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and landing (STOL) utility aircraft, vehicles, and patrol 
craft as well as cross-training, exercises, and officer 
schooling.39   
Although they couldn’t foresee it at the time, the 
Australians had formed a relationship with their closest 
possible foe that would last until the present day. 
President Suharto would remain in power until 1998 and his 
peaceful (albeit authoritarian) rule would eventually give 
way to a democratic process.  Even Indonesia’s military 
invasion of East Timor in 1976 was little more than a speed 
bump on the road to successful bilateral relations, 
especially in view of the fact that an active Marxist 
movement existed in the former Portuguese colony.   
In stark contrast to the previous Confrontation 
period, the development of stable relations between Jakarta 
and Canberra is eminently noteworthy.  The relationship was 
made possible not by any deterrent effect of the RAN, or 
even of the entire ADF, but rather by the dangerously 
polarized world of the Cold War, which led to the conscious 
decision by Jakarta and the Western powers to develop a 
peaceful and mutually beneficial relationship.   
The need for military power did not disappear, 
however.  The RAN continued to conduct exercises and port 
visits which contributed to Australia’s status as a 
stabilizer in the region and as a participant in ANZUS.  
During this time it became apparent that SEATO would not 
exist indefinitely.  Its primary function, to contain 
communism in Southeast Asia, had fallen by the wayside.  As 
a result, Australia chose to end its participation in SEATO 
                     39 P.D. Hastings, “Regional Defense Co-operation,” in David Stevens, and D. 
M. Horner, eds, Australian Defense Policy for the 1980s, (St Lucia: University 
of Queensland Press, 1982), 129-30. 
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naval exercises in 1973.  However, the RAN remained very 
active in other exercises throughout the period.  For 
example, the service took part in the Rim of the Pacific 
(RIMPAC) exercises that began in 1971 off the coast of 
Hawaii. 40  The RAN also participated in bilateral exercises 
in the Indian Ocean with the American Navy later in the 
1970s.  These exercises were significant because they 
extended the Pacific area concept of ANZUS into the Indian 
Ocean off Western Australia. 41 
During the 1970’s the Indian Ocean became an 
interesting playing field for the two superpowers.  The 
Soviets were working to offset both Chinese and American 
influence in the region.  Their modus operandi included 
instituting full time naval deployments, establishing 
friendship treaties, conducting various construction 
projects and gaining diplomatic influence throughout the 
region.  Admiral Gorchakov’s fleet was forward deployed to 
Somalia, making routine port visits throughout the region.  
Soviet naval operations kept the lines of communication 
open between the major Soviet fleets and maintained a 
watchful eye on the U.S. Navy, whose newly developed 
Trident missiles were capable of striking Russia if 
launched from nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines 
in the Indian Ocean.42   
                     40 David Stevens, The Royal Australian Navy part of The Australian Centenary 
History of Defense (Vol III), (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 229. 
41 These are the Sandgroper exercises.  They are held every other year.  
United States, Department of State, “Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski from 
Peter Tarnoff regarding Vice President Walter Mondale's trip to Southeast Asia, 
Australia, and New Zealand,” dated 31 Jan 1979, (Washington: Dept. of State, 
Declassified Document Reference System, declass on 13 Sep 1999) accessed 25 
Mar 2007. 
42 Discussed in detail throughout Australia Parliament, Australia and the 
Indian Ocean Region, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Office, 1976), 
89-128 and Ray Sunderland, Australia’s Changing Threat Perceptions, (Canberra, 
Australian National University, 1984), 5-10. 
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In response, the Americans deployed additional naval 
units to counter the Soviet presence and also to respond to 
the growing issue of energy security, which first reared 
its now-familiar ugly head during the 1973 oil embargo.  
(It is worth noting that the embargo dramatically impacted 
the Australian economy as well as that of the U.S. and 
other nations.)  As the world watched, the political 
situation in the Middle East would only grow worse as 
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) disintegrated, Iran 
succumbed to revolution and the Soviets invaded 
Afghanistan.   
In addition to conducting exercises with the 
Americans, the RAN also began routine port visits to South 
Asia and East Africa to reinforce the peaceful relations 
and stability that Australia desired with its regional 
neighbors.43  The RAN recognized that, in addition to 
supporting their Cold War superpower ally, the presence of 
their naval force and its interaction with the region’s 
coastal nations also would help ensure that the vital sea 
lanes carrying the vast majority of Australia’s goods would 
remain open and free in accordance with international law.  
The RAN was particularly good at this function – a core 
navy mission in peacetime – given their limited resources. 
The Navy’s mission to “show the flag” also provided a 
good complement to the bilateral economic support and 
international aid contributions then being made by 
Australia to maintain its interests in the region, although 
it was overshadowed by the concept of self reliance which 
                     43 Discussed in detail throughout Australia Parliament, Australia and the 
Indian Ocean Region, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Office, 1976), 
89-128 and Ray Sunderland, Australia’s Changing Threat Perceptions, (Canberra, 
Australian National University, 1984), 5-10. 
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played a greater role in shaping the RAN.  During that 
time, Canberra’s various forms of international financial 
support accounted for approximately 0.5% of GDP, a 
particularly noteworthy amount.  The amount of Australia’s 
1976 aid package for the region was nearly half that 
provided by Washington and was significantly eclipsed only 
by Tokyo’s contribution,44 this at a time when the United 
States was far and away the world’s dominant economy and 
when Japan, on the cusp of becoming the second largest 
economy in the world, was limited to using less than 1% of 
its GDP for defense.  For Australia, this particular use of 
soft power enhanced bilateral relations with any number of 
nations at a much faster pace, and at less cost, than 
through the ability to project military might. 
Maintaining balance and openness with the nations of 
SEA while also maintaining a military alliance with the 
United States was not an easy task.  According to a 1976 
Australian Senate report, Canberra was forced to strike a 
compromise between supporting the Western superpower, 
maintaining close relationships with countries that were 
openly friendly with the Soviet Union, and with those who 
wished to create a “Zone of Peace” through the United 
Nations.  Australia belonged to an ad hoc UN working group 
formed to consider this and other options for the region, 
and they viewed the concept as a wonderful idea with no 
chance of success given the bi-polar nature of the world. 45  
The idealistic idea of Australia advocating neutrality or 
actually becoming a neutral party would never overcome its 
realist need to maintain the superpower alliance with its 
                     44 Australia Parliament, Australia and the Indian Ocean Region (Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Office, 1976), 157-163. 
45 Ibid., 135-138. 
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significant benefits.  As a result, Canberra routinely 
called on Washington to reinforce the importance of the 
ANZUS relationship and the maintenance of America’s 
security role in the region.46 
After the invasion of Afghanistan, the Australians 
assumed an even more practical stance by aligning more 
closely with the United States as détente ended and the 
Cold War heated up for the final time.  The circumstances 
generated still more discussion regarding the type of force 
necessary to defend Australia, resulting in an immediate 
increase in defense spending.  Given the fundamental nature 
of the Australian strategy, this loosening of the purse 
strings did not signal an overall reversion to the forward 
defense concept.  Nevertheless, in November 1982 Prime 
Minister Ian Sinclair stated publicly that forward defense 
was “strategically essential”47; and the RAN accelerated its 
patrol boat orders, ordered a fourth FFG-7 class ship from 
the United States and was allowed to upgrade its air 
defense destroyers.48  
The largest single procurement planned by the RAN at 
this time was a replacement for Melbourne, a plan that had 
been in the works since 1970.49  Throughout the era the 
Department of Defense and the Cabinet had routinely 
                     46 See period statements located in United States, Office of the President. 
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, (Millwood, NY: KTO Press, 
1978) and United States, Department of State, Declassified Document Reference 
System accessed on 21 Feb 2007. 
47 Ray Sunderland, Australia’s Changing Threat Perceptions, (Canberra, 
Australian National University, 1984), 9. 
48 Indicative of just how tight the defense budget was, this action deferred 
the building of the two FFG-7 hulls to be built in Australia until later in the 
1980s. 
49 Anthony Wright and Royal Australian Navy, Maritime Studies Program, 
Australian Carrier Decisions : The Acquisition of HMA Ships Albatross, Sydney 
and Melbourne, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs no. 4, (Canberra: Maritime 
Studies Program, Dept. of Defense (Navy), 1998), 165. 
28 
approved continuing the plans for replacement.  It was 
anticipated that construction of a replacement would begin 
in the early 1980s and that Melbourne would undergo two 
more overhauls, be paid off and replaced.  The process was 
not a smooth one.  Not everyone agreed that a new carrier 
was a sound idea.  Eventually the plan would fail.  It is 
difficult to list the many arguments put forward to justify 
the purchase of the new carrier during the thirteen years 
of debate that preceded the final collapse of the plan.  In 
1982, Gary Brown and Derek Woolner surmised that the Navy 
neither successfully articulated why it needed a new 
carrier, nor fended of the ever-increasing arguments 
against such an investment.50  There is little doubt that 
Melbourne’s planned replacement was a grand vessel whose 
presence would indeed offer some merit.  However, given the 
primacy of continental defense as a strategic priority, it 
is remarkable that the procurement process was able to 
proceed as far as it did. 51   
                     50 Gary Brown and Derek Woolner, A New Aircraft Carrier for the Royal 
Australian Navy?, (Canberra: Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, 1982). 
51 On the subject of the Carrier decision background review: Australia Navy 
Office, and Australia, Australia's Navy, (Canberra: Published for the 
Department of Defense, Chief of Naval Staff by the Australian Gov't. Pub. 
Service, 1990); David Stevens, The Royal Australian Navy part of The Australian 
Centenary History of Defense (Vol III), (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 
2001) and James A Boutilier, “Get Big or Get Out: The Canadian and Australian 
Decisions to Abandon Aircraft Carriers,” in T. R Frame, James Goldrick and P. D 
Jones, eds, Reflections on the RAN, (Kenthurst, NSW: Kangaroo Press, 1991).  
For a thorough reading of critic comments review: Gary Brown and Derek Woolner, 
A New Aircraft Carrier for the Royal Australian Navy?, (Canberra: Australian 
National University, 1982); J. O. Langtry and Desmond Ball, Controlling 
Australia’s Threat Environment: a Methodology for Planning Australian Defense 
Force, (Canberra: Australian National University, 1979); J. O. Langtry and 
Desmond Ball, The Concept of Force Multipliers and the Development of the 
Australian Defense Force, (Canberra, Australian National University, 1983); 
Michael MccGwire, Australia as a Regional Seapower: an External View, 
(Canberra, Australian National University, 1979); Thomas B Millar, Global and 
Regional Changes and Their Defense Implications for Australia to the Year 2000, 
(Canberra, Australian National University, 1980); Robert O’Neill, Australia’s 
Future Defense Requirements, (Canberra: Australian National University, 1980); 
Alan Robertson, The Need for an Australian Aircraft Carrier Capability, 
(Canberra: Australian National University, 1982). 
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The RAN asserted that having a carrier would provide 
the first line of defense for Australia.  The carrier task 
force would also be critical in securing sea lines of 
communication and protecting valuable cargoes during 
transport in time of conflict.  It was also argued that the 
carrier was a key part of the ADF “core force”52 concept 
since it would provide the necessary fixed-wing capability 
needed to cope with a future regional peer competitor. 
The primary obstacles encountered by the Navy in 
arguing for their new ship were cost, relative use, and the 
risks of operating a carrier in the age of precision-guided 
munitions.  The real-world costs of purchasing modern 
carriers had increased 90% since 1950, and the cost of 
carrier-based high-performance fighters and attack aircraft 
had increased by nearly 200% over the same time period.53  
Additionally, the carrier expenditure was being considered 
at the same time that the RAAF was preparing to purchase 
upgrades for its F-111Cs and P-3s, as well as replacements 
for its Mirage III.  This brought into direct strategic 
conflict the role of each service in continental defense.  
One period author commented that for the cost of a carrier, 
without its complement of aircraft, an entire squadron of 
F-18s could be purchased.  At the time the RAAF was 
discussing whether to purchase F-16s or F-18s.  The F-18 
was a more expensive airframe but was dual-mission-capable 
and would offer maritime strike capability when equipped 
with the harpoon missile system that the Australians were 
                     52 The term refers to the basic force structure around which a larger ADF 
would be built once the threat to Australia rose over a period of time. 
53 S.J. Dudzinsky and James Digby, “The Strategic and Tactical Implications 
of New Weapons Technologies,” in Robert O’Neill, ed, The Defense of Australia: 
Fundamental New Aspects, (Canberra: Australian National University, 1976), 51-
2. 
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preparing to procure.  As time passed, it became 
increasingly difficult for the Navy to sell the idea that 
only one carrier, which was clearly all that could be 
afforded or manned, would be able to protect Australia’s 
coastal waters better than RAAF patrol and strike aircraft.   
The RAN, recognizing the growing difficulties 
associated with its new carrier plan, reverted to the 
strategy that had saved Melbourne during the 1950s.  
Responding to the cost and threat issues being raised, the 
Navy decided its new ship to be rotary wing and 
short/vertical take off and landing (S/VTOL) capable only.  
Soon after this announcement, the decision was also made to 
defer the purchase of the fixed wing aircraft until at 
least 1983, a logical step for budgetary reasons and also 
because at the time, the only aircraft available for 
purchase was the British Sea Harrier.   
This new plan, of course, would not provide continuity 
for the fleet air arm in fixed-wing operations.  
Additionally, the carrier would require significant 
screening escorts, vessels whose purchase could not be 
budgeted simultaneously with that of the new carrier.   The 
revolution in inexpensive precision-guided munitions would 
also render the carrier indefensible, especially with no 
fixed-wing air defense assets.  It was also pointed out by 
critics that that ASW-capable rotary-wing assets were more 
economically operated from smaller frigates and destroyers, 
and that a more appropriate plan might be to invest in 
SOSUS arrays and additional P-3 maritime patrol aircraft 
which could cover a wider area, thereby controlling the 
approaches to Australia at a much reduced cost. 
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The idea that a carrier task group was needed to 
protect longer sea lines was also torpedoed.  It was felt 
that in a low or medium intensity contingency, which was 
the most likely scenario, a regional enemy would not be 
able to project sufficient power to prevent Australia from 
rerouting sea traffic until it reached the focal points 
around its ports.  Additionally, flags of convenience were 
not the norm during the era, so actions would directly 
impact the maritime nations in which the ships were 
registered.   
Given the substantial jockeying carried out by RAN 
leadership while attempting to usher along the carrier 
replacement concept, it is amazing that the idea nearly 
succeeded.  By early 1981, the Australians had decided to 
either purchase a modified Iwo Jima class LPH (now referred 
to as LHA) or a variant of the Sea Control Ship that the US 
Navy had designed for Spain.  A design shop (PMS 308) 
opened in San Diego shortly thereafter.54     
In mid-1981, Great Britain determined that HMS 
Invincible would be designated surplus, and it was promptly 
offered to the Australian government for $A285 million.55  
Although the Invincible class had not made the final cut as 
a possible replacement for Melbourne, it was hard to pass 
on the offer, despite the fact that the purchase would 
create numerous logistic, supply and equipment issues, 
since the rest of the surface force was primarily American-
produced or indigenously sourced by that time.  After a 
                     54 Anthony Wright and Royal Australian Navy, Maritime Studies Program, 
Australian Carrier Decisions: The Acquisition of HMA Ships Albatross, Sydney 
and Melbourne, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs no. 4, (Canberra: Maritime 
Studies Program, Dept. of Defense (Navy), 1998), 167. 
55 Ibid., 167-8.  Buying the British CV would have saved approximately $A500 
million over the purchase of a new carrier. 
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quick study, Prime Minister Fraser (Liberal Party) 
announced that Invincible would be purchased and renamed 
HMAS Australia.  PMS 308 closed and a transition shop was 
opened in London.56  Melbourne was quickly decommissioned 
prior to commencing her final yard period, saving the RAN 
even more money. 
Just when all seemed right for the Royal Australian 
Navy regarding carrier acquisition, the Falklands War 
reversed the decision of the British government, which 
decided to retain Invincible.  In its place, the British 
offered HMS Hermes on good terms or on lease until a new 
carrier could be built or commissioned.  Hermes, however, 
was almost as weathered as Melbourne.  Australia’s only 
viable options were to re-commission Melbourne, re-commit 
to the American designs, or do nothing.  Within a few weeks 
of the British decision to rescind their offer, and 
following more bureaucratic discussion on the subject, the 
decision was made not to seek a replacement for Melbourne. 
The decision was not announced until after pending 
Parliamentary elections, the results of which put the Labor 
Party back in power.  This would seem to indicate that the 
decision not to purchase a new carrier had, indeed, been 
made earlier and that the ruling Liberal Party did not wish 
to upset pro-military voters going into the election.  A 
second factor contributing to the decision was that the 
Australian economy had just lapsed into a severe recession 
cycle.57  Purchasing an expensive piece of military 
equipment would be particularly unattractive politically, 
                     56 Anthony Wright and Royal Australian Navy, Maritime Studies Program, 
Australian Carrier Decisions: The Acquisition of HMA Ships Albatross, Sydney 
and Melbourne, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs no. 4, (Canberra: Maritime 
Studies Program, Dept. of Defense (Navy), 1998), 172. 
57 NYT, March 4, 1984, IV, 1:4. 
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especially given that the cost had skyrocketed immediately 
after the loss of a bargain basement deal. 
An additional economic consideration that the RAN 
needed to address was its legal obligation to protect the 
200 nm Economic Exclusion Zone created by the United 
Nations Law of the Sea, which entered draft form in 1975.  
This obligation to protect sea resources, including 
fisheries and oil platforms, was assuming increased 
importance to maritime nations and added to the missions of 
navies, like Australia’s, that also performed Coast Guard 
functions.  Since the threat was low in traditional defense 
missions, operational tasking related to constabulary 
functions would help allocate additional resources to the 
RAN and to other service’s assets, such as the RAAF’s P-3s.  
During the 1970s, the RAN also took on constabulary 
missions such as refugee-related operations and customs 
enforcement in order to meet national requirements and 
maintain its relevancy.  These missions helped lead to the 
purchase of the Fremantle class patrol ships and the 
opening of new Naval Stations in northern Australia at 
Cairns and Darwin58. 
In addition to the movement of patrol boats northward, 
a concerted effort was made to move some combatant assets 
to more appropriate locations in Western Australia, 
creating a two fleet concept.59  The commissioning of HMAS 
Stirling at Perth in 1978 allowed the RAN to better meet 
the changing threat environment and to better protect the 
air-sea gap approaches to the continent.  If a threat were 
                     58 Royal Australian Navy website <www.navy.gov.au> accessed 22 Feb 2007.  
HMAS Coonawarra opened in 1982 in Darwin, while HMAS Cairns commissioned in 
1974. 
59 Royal Australian Navy website <www.navy.gov.au> accessed 22 Feb 2007.   
34 
to come from the north, deployment time would be shorter 
and forces would not need to transit the Torres Strait, a 
natural chokepoint.  Protecting the west coast’s focal 
points (shipping approaches) would also be significantly 
easier since the necessary ships would already be on 
location.   
Deterrence was also a major factor in Australia’s 
defense preparedness.  Operational analysis suggested that 
each service would be able to contribute to the overall 
defense of the nation and that continuous reassessment 
would be needed to determine whether the level of 
deterrence was satisfactory.  For the army, this required 
the mobility to meet enemy attack forces or raiding parties 
that might cross the air-sea gap to land anywhere on the 
large, remote continent.  For the air force, emphasis was 
placed on sea strike and land base retaliatory capability 
including updating the F-111C for land and sea strike with 
precision guided munitions, the previously mentioned 
purchase of F-18s, modernization of existing P-3s and the 
purchase of additional new ones.  Following the loss of its 
carrier, the RAN’s deterrence capabilities fell into the 
hands of its diesel submarines.  Taken in total, 
Australia’s forces would have made it extraordinarily 
difficult for any regional power to project force onto the 
Australian mainland.   
From the viewpoint of the RAN, however, challenges 
still existed.  Diesel submarines are not particularly 
expensive when compared with the cost and difficulty of 
defending against them.  However, the RAN could only 
afford, maintain, and man one squadron of aging Oberons, 
which were located in one homeport, limiting their 
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usefulness on a continent as large as Australia.  Although 
planning for the replacement class of ship began in the 
early 1980’s, the first of the six Collins class submarines 
would not commission until 1996. 
The Navy’s struggle to obtain a replacement for its 
aircraft carrier was accompanied by the planned replacement 
of other surface ships in its line of battle and also of 
their support ships.  The less than glamorous mission of 
minesweeping received a positive endorsement from the 
Defense Department and Parliament since it was thought that 
mines, being inexpensive, easy to use, and inventoried by 
nearly every nation, would be used against Australia by 
regional opponents.  Canberra endorsed a plan to purchase 
two indigenously produced experimental mine hunting 
catamarans in 1981.  Their procurement was delayed until 
1993, and they were determined to be inadequate after 
shakedown.60  Plans were also made for the purchase of two 
new replenishment ships, while design and cost delays 
affected the purchase of a replacement fleet supply ship. 
The long-term replacement plan for the aging destroyer 
fleet would prove to be even more difficult to push 
through.  Both the River class and the American-built air 
defense destroyers were approaching the end of their 
lifespan, and they were also made obsolete by the 
introduction of modern weaponry by India and many of the 
ASEAN nations, whose military spending was, on average, 
double that of Australia in GDP terms.61  Although Australia 
perceived its own threat as low, other nations feared by 
                     60 David Stevens, The Royal Australian Navy part of The Australian Centenary 
History of Defense (Vol III), (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 275. 
61 Australia generally spent 3% of GDP, while India and ASEAN nations 
averaged 6%. 
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one or more of their neighbors.  Additionally, as less 
affluent nations became more economically successful, their 
governments were inclined to build militaries capable of 
protecting their new wealth and status.   
At the same time, the RAN needed to continue its 
integration with the USN as it increased its own 
technological advantage with advancements in modern 
weapons, integrated architectures, and the phasing out of 
older frameworks such as the Tarter missile system.  The 
American Navy was steadily increasing its expertise in the 
use of satellite communications and data exchange as the 
revolution in military affairs continued in both 
connectivity and precision-guided munitions.   
Following the failure to complete the initial planning 
for a domestically built light destroyer, the Navy launched 
programs to replace the River class and the DDGs.  River 
class vessels were purpose built ASW destroyers built in 
Australia.  They were continuously modified to meet USN 
command and control standards and were equipped with 
indigenously-produced Ikara anti-submarine missiles 
comparable to America’s anti-submarine rocket torpedo 
(ASROC).  The replacement for the River class was quickly 
determined to be the American built Oliver Hazard Perry 
class frigate, which was a significant improvement in 
capability for the RAN.  In the US Navy, this ship design 
was the low-end escort ship of Chief of Naval Operations 
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt’s “high-low concept”.62  This frigate 
met the RAN’s fiscal constraints and its need to continue 
to integrate with the USN as part of the ANZUS commitment.  
                     62 Elmo R. Zumwalt, On Watch: A Memoir, (New York: Quadrangle/New York Times 
Book Co, 1976), 59-84. 
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Additionally, it was multi-mission capable and able to 
protect both itself and other assets in its close vicinity.  
Unfortunately, the RAN was unable to afford the most 
important part of the ASW integrated weapon suite, the 
Light Airborne Multipurpose Sensor Mark III (LAMPS MKIII) 
SH-60B helicopters.   
Replacing Brisbane and her two sister ships was more 
difficult since no direct modern replacement for the class 
was available.  Despite upgrades made in the United States 
following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (including SM-
1 missiles), the three vessels were nearing the end of 
their service lives.  The next generation air defense ship 
built by the American navy was the AEGIS multi-mission 
cruiser, a cutting edge, and consequently very expensive, 
vessel that would not commission until 1983.  Britain’s air 
defense destroyer was the newly developed Type 42 
destroyer, but it was no better equipped to fight an air 
battle than the American FFG.  As in the 1950s, the RAN 
chose the American ship over the British offering to ease 
training, logistic, and interoperability concerns.  Initial 
planning called for five hulls.  The first three were to be 
produced in the United States, while the remaining two were 
contracted to be built by the RAN’s Naval Dockyard. After 
the addition of an additional sixth hull from the United 
States, there was a financial delay in freeing funding for 
the production run of the Australian-built FFGs.  The first 
of the six hulls commissioned in 1983.  The sixth and final 
would not commission until 1993. 
During this entire period Australia’s defense spending 
remained at a near constant three percent of the gross 
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national product.63  Most of the money spent on national 
defense procurement left the country and therefore did not 
stimulate the domestic economy.  Additionally, what arms 
Australia did produce did not sell well overseas; the 
domestic defense industry remained small and completely 
reliant upon government spending.64  The result was not 
Self-Reliance -- never a realistic possibility in any case 
-- but a continued dependence on its more powerful ally.  
This was particularly true for the RAN, which relied 
heavily on high tech, high cost equipment whose purchase 
took many years produce and pay off. 
Despite the tone of Self-Reliance set by the 
government, Australian society generally felt that 
increased military spending was not warranted given the 
absence of an immediate threat and under the watchful eye 
of the United States in the Cold War.65  The domestic 
political agenda placed economic development and social 
spending above military spending in importance.  As one 
author noted at the time, the only way to increase military 
allocations was to ensure that GNP increased.  That way, 
three percent had a larger monetary value. 66  
Unfortunately, with the Australian economy in recession for 
much of this period, three percent meant even less than the 
minimum programmed into its five-year defense programs 
                     63 Desmond J. Ball, “Equipment Policy for the Defense of Australia,” in 
Robert O’Neill, ed, The Defense of Australia: Fundamental New Aspects, 
(Canberra: Australian National University, 1976), 99. 
64 A brief summary of these issues can be read in L. G. Randell, “Australian 
Defense Industry” and Peter Robinson, “Defense and the Economy” both located in 
Stevens, David, and Horner, D. M., eds. Australian Defense Policy for the 
1980s, (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1982), 231-243, 275-289. 
65 F. A Mediansky, The Military and Australia's Defense, (Melbourne: Longman 
Cheshire, 1979), 2-22. 
66 David Stevens, “Conclusions” in David Stevens and D. M. Horner, eds, 
Australian Defense Policy for the 1980s, (St Lucia: University of Queensland 
Press, 1982), 295. 
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(FYDP).  Even after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
which made it politically and socially expedient to 
increase defense spending, the government was unable to 
follow through on long-term budget commitments, shorting 
each successive year and delaying an accelerated 
acquisition program for the navy.67 
As 1983 came to a close the concept of Self-Reliance, 
buoyed by Canberra’s reaction to the Guam Doctrine and the 
changing local threat environment of the 1970s, remained 
firmly in place and continued to have a significant effect 
on the Royal Australian Navy.  The RAN looked and operated 
quite differently than it had envisioned when it created 
its 1973 wish list of assets.  Its only carrier was gone 
and the service no longer boasted any offensive striking 
power, a role it had ceded completely to the Royal 
Australian Air Force.  Its new frigates and the rest of its 
surface assets were the fleet’s backbone, participating in 
nearly every mission the Australian government directed.  
The fleet was stretched thin defending the Australian 
continent, maintaining relations with the United States 
Navy and conducting diplomatic visits throughout the 
region.  Nevertheless, it carried out these missions and 
its additional constabulary duties with great efficiency as 
well as maintaining a credible, although expensive, 
deterrent threat via its diesel submarines, in further 
support of the nation’s needs.  
 
 
                     67 Gary Brown, and Derek Woolner, A New Aircraft Carrier for the Royal 
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IV. A RETURN TO FORWARD DEFENSE 
Following the end of the Cold War, Australia made a 
continuously progressive shift toward greater direct 
military involvement in its region and around the world.  
This move was brought about by the dynamically changing 
world of the 1990s and the early 21st century, in which 
Canberra recognized the need to maintain stability in her 
region, while supporting the international community and 
her closest ally, the United States.  The period is bounded 
by the two wars in Iraq, to which the RAN selflessly 
contributed.  Sandwiched between the wars are two 
significant developments -- the liberal ideal of the “new 
world order” described by President George H.W. Bush, 
following the 1991 Iraq War (to first be put to the test in 
the Middle East), and the Washington’s recognition of the 
rise of ideological terrorism to the world stage following 
the tragic events of September 11, 2001. 
 It is in this context that we can successfully examine 
how Australia’s defense policy has broadened from merely 
protecting the Australian continent and its approaches to 
something much more complex.  Australia has adopted an 
integrated concept of forward defense encompassing local 
and regional security efforts, reflecting Canberra’s desire 
to assume a greater leadership role in the region.  In 
addition, recognizing the nature of our globalized and 
interconnected world, Canberra has taken on a much more 
active role outside Southeast Asia, both alongside its 
global ally and in support of United Nations missions in 
the Levant and Africa.  Although Canberra’s defense policy 
and its strategic implementation have not formally been 
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described as “forward defense” by the government of 
Australia, it is nonetheless an apt depiction.  The RAN has 
benefited from the strategic realignment of this period and 
is taking steps, as are their sister services, toward 
ensuring success in meeting the long term political 
objectives of its government. 
 One aspect that has shaped Australia’s position since 
the end of the twentieth century has been concern regarding 
Washington’s Asia-Pacific policy, a concern which has led 
to an increasingly interwoven relationship with the United 
States.  The role of American foreign policy in the future 
of the region became somewhat ambiguous following the end 
of the Cold War.  Canberra desires Washington’s continued 
influence, seeing the United States as the ultimate 
guarantor of peace and stability in the region although no 
single overt threat has presented itself.  Despite the 
absence of a conventional threat to Australian sovereignty, 
the long-term rise of China and her interaction with Japan 
and Korea is considered vitally important to its national 
interest, as is the stability of nations like Indonesia and 
Pakistan where the Asia-Pacific region flirts with chaos.  
It is Canberra’s continuing belief that the region is 
safest with Washington taking a keen interest in events 
there.68 
 The beginning of Australia’s transformation away from 
self-reliance was signaled by Saddam Hussein’s invasion of 
Kuwait in April 1990.  Australia quickly joined the 
coalition being built by Washington as part of Desert                      68 Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Australia’s Foreign 
Policy: Address by the Honourable Alexander Downer, MP, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, to the Joint Service Staff College, Canberra” (26 March 1997) taken 
from DFAT website 
<http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/speeches/foreign/1997/aust_for_pol.html> accessed 
7 Feb 2007. 
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Shield/Desert Storm.  For this mission, which lasted nearly 
one year, the RAN maintained a surface task force of two to 
three combatants, an oiler, Combat Demolition Team 1 and 
medical units in theater.69  Canberra’s action was not an 
extension of ANZUS, as had occurred in the Indian Ocean 
during the 1970s.  Instead, as she had done in Korea, 
Canberra chose to join with the United States to return 
stability to an area important to world peace.  Standing up 
against tyranny reflected the general understanding that 
with the demise of the Soviet Union, the democracies of the 
world could turn toward making the world a better place, 
which Richard Hill argues is an important rationale for 
middle powers to build an expeditionary capability into 
their navies.70 
 Following Desert Storm, as part of Operation Southern 
Watch, the RAN maintained its coalition presence in the 
area to help the United States Fifth Fleet enforce the UN 
Security Council’s long-term sanctions.  Between the end of 
the Desert Storm and the build-up for Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, RAN surface assets continued to deploy to the 
Northern Arabian Gulf, denying the Iraqi regime both 
critical military and dual use goods, as well as 
maintaining a seamless blockade which kept illegal oil from 
leaving the country in return for monetary reimbursement.71 
 Much closer to home, the RAN worked closely with the 
Australian Army and United Nations forces as Australia 
                     69 Australia Department of Navy, Sea Power Centre, Database of Royal 
Australian Navy Operations, 1990-2005, (Sea Power Centre, Canberra: 2005), 6-10 
taken from Sea Power Centre website <http://www.navy.gov.au/spc> accessed 04 
Feb 2007. 
70 Richard Hill and Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre, Medium Power 
Strategy Revisited, (Sea Power Centre, Canberra: 2000). 
71 Australia Department of Navy, Sea Power Centre, Database of Royal 
Australian Navy Operations, 1990-2005, 11-43. 
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assumed the lead role in International Force East Timor 
(INTERFET), the UN-mandated mission working to restore 
stability to East Timor, which voted to withdraw from 
federation with Indonesia in 1999.  The situation was 
volatile, as supporters of independence and those loyal to 
Jakarta clashed.  Given East Timor’s proximity to 
Australia, Canberra had to act. As had happened in the 
1950s, Canberra’s request that the American military take 
the leadership role was rejected.  Instead, Washington 
suggested that Australia take responsibility for her own 
neighborhood.  However, the United States did agree to a 
participatory role which included the dispatch of the 
cruiser USS Mobile Bay.72  The RAN took great pride in their 
naval contribution, providing dedicated lift and logistic 
support and a continuous diplomatic and protective naval 
presence at Dili throughout the mission.  From a 
transformational standpoint, the Navy also successfully 
experimented with a high-speed catamaran ferry to move 
supplies and troops from Northern Australia to Dili.  The 
craft earned the nickname the “Dili Express,”73 and the 
concept was quickly adopted by the U.S. Navy and Army, who 
have tested two catamarans built by AUSTEL Shipyard in 
Australia and used them to quickly ferry supplies in the 
Arabian Gulf during the build-up for Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. 
                     72 Rod Lyon and William T. Tow, The Future of the Australian-U.S. Security 
Relationship, (US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, 
2003), 6, taken from the SSI website 
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=50> 
accessed 7 Feb 2007. 
73 RAN Navy News, “Last Rights for Dili Express,” (11 Jun 2001) taken from 
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 In 2000, the Department of Defense issued a new White 
Paper.  Although not abandoning self-reliance altogether, 
the document illustrates the slow evolution away from self-
reliance as the only pillar of Australian strategy.   
The priority task for the ADF is the defense of 
Australia. Our approach is shaped by three 
principles. First, we must be able to defend 
Australia without relying on the combat forces of 
other countries - self-reliance. Second, 
Australia needs to be able to control the air and 
sea approaches to our continent - a maritime 
strategy. Third, although Australia’s strategic 
posture is defensive, we would seek to attack 
hostile forces as far from our shores as possible 
– proactive operations.74 
This statement reflects two significant changes in the 
nature of Australian military strategy.  The second 
principle, defined as being accomplished by a maritime 
strategy, encompasses the full spectrum of military 
operations.  The humanitarian and stabilization missions 
which Australia had been successfully executing for decades 
were to continue, but also included was the following: 
In the highly unlikely event of unprovoked armed 
aggression against any of our immediate 
neighbours, Australia would want to be in a 
position, if asked, to help our neighbours defend 
themselves.75 
The final principle of Australian strategy – proactive 
operations – is important because it stated the significant 
fact that, in the future, Australia would be an active 
partner in “coalitions of forces to meet crises beyond our 
                     74 Australia Department of Defense, Defense 2000: Our Future Defense Force 
(DOD, Canberra, 2000), XI, taken from the Australian DOD website 
<http://www.defense.gov.au/whitepaper/> accessed 7 Feb 2007. 
75 Ibid., XI. 
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immediate neighbourhood.”76  In time to come, Australia can 
increasingly be expected to support missions outside of 
their immediate area which are not in response to a direct 
threat to Canberra’s security.   
The above views corresponded to a significant shift in 
the purpose and missions of the Navy, as well as in the 
types of platforms needed to accomplish them.  The White 
Paper gave increased priority to both the service assets 
and the vision of long-term joint maritime strategy.  Due 
consideration was also given to the increasing asymmetry 
and inter-connectedness of the battlespace brought about by 
the information revolution in military affairs.  The Air 
Force was to seek a single replacement F-111 and F/A-18, 
and upgrades or replacement for the P-3 patrol aircraft 
would also be sought.  Naval projects highlighted in the 
manuscript included: 
 
 Upgrading the FFG class with SM-2 missiles 
 Increasing combat capability of the ANZAC 
frigates 
 A new class of long-range air defense ships 
 Replacement replenishment ships 
 Upgrades to the Seasprite and Seahawk helicopter 
fleet 
 Acoustic and combat systems upgrades to the 
Collins class submarines 
 Development of a new heavyweight (submarine 
launched) torpedo 
                     76 Australia Department of Defense, Defense 2000: Our Future Defense Force 
(DOD, Canberra, 2000), 51, taken from the Australian DOD website 
<http://www.defense.gov.au/whitepaper/> accessed 7 Feb 2007. 
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 A replacement for the Fremantle class patrol 
boats77 
 
In general, the upgrades to the service fleet show 
that the government and Defense planned to increase the 
role of the RAN in future expeditionary missions involving 
Australian assets, and in further involvement in coalition 
operations, especially with the United States.   
The FFG improvements were intended to give the RAN a 
limited air defense role while it developed replacements 
for the Brisbane class, whose last hull would decommission 
in 2001.  By 2000 the SM-1 missile was obsolete compared to 
anti-ship missiles produced and exported by the major 
weapons-producing countries (Russia, France, Israel, Italy, 
the United States, and even China).  Even with the newest 
version of the SM-2 missile, the combat suite of the FFGs 
was capable of engaging only two targets at a time, using 
an older generation of equipment not designed to optimize 
the reaction time needed in a modern missile attack detect-
to-engage sequence. 
The upgrades to the ANZAC class were a mix of primary 
mission and self-defense upgrades.  Notable inclusions were 
the Harpoon anti-ship missile, the evolved Sea-Sparrow 
missile (ESSM) which fit into a compact vertical launch 
cell, and radar upgrades to support ESSM. 
In 2003, the new torpedo selected was the latest 
generation MK48 Mod 7 ADCAP (advanced capability) torpedo, 
a variant of the type already in use by both the Australian 
and American navies.78  In keeping with the desire to 
                     77 Australia Department of Defense, Defense 2000: Our Future Defense Force 
(DOD, Canberra, 2000), 84-94, taken from the Australian DOD website 
<http://www.defense.gov.au/whitepaper/> accessed 7 Feb 2007. 
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procure its most complex weapons systems from the United 
States, Canberra announced in 2006 that the three planned 
long-range air defense ships would be built in Australia 
and would include the AEGIS weapons system.79  This will 
give the RAN future capability to add Theater Ballistic 
Missile Defense (TBMD), which the USN is currently 
developing, and also allows for the possible addition of 
the Tomahawk weapon system, which would give the Australian 
Navy a strike capability that it has not had since the A-4 
left its inventory. 
Following 9/11, the planned installation of the NULKA 
passive anti-ship missile decoy system on all ships was 
accelerated.  NULKA, which is Australian designed and 
produced, is also being outfitted on American warships.80 
Taken in total, the three principles and the 
capabilities discussed in the 2000 Defense White Paper were 
precisely what American policymakers have wished 
Australia’s alliance relationship to be since ANZUS was 
first signed.  The US-Australia alliance was, at that 
point, ready to face 9/11; and the RAN was prepared to do 
its part. 
A mere three days after the attack on the United 
States, the Prime Minister of Australia aligned strongly 
with the United States in the emerging war on terrorism, 
invoking Article IV of the ANZUS treaty for the first time 
in the Alliance’s 50 year history.  In a press conference, 
                     79 Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter, September 2005, 6-8. 
80 Antony Preston, “Australian Naval Budget Receives Major Funding Boost,” 
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and with much pride, Prime Minister Howard, who was in 
Washington when the attacks occurred,81 declared:  
 The Australian people have been shocked and 
outraged at the enormity of the terrorist attacks 
on the United States. These heinous crimes have 
caused catastrophic loss of life, injury and 
destruction. We anticipate that a significant 
number of Australian nationals are included among 
those who lost their lives.  
I have already conveyed to the President of the 
United States the condolences of the Australian 
Government and people, and expressed our resolute 
support for the United States at this most 
difficult time. 
The terrorist attacks on the United States were 
discussed today at a special Cabinet meeting that 
I convened on my return from the United States. 
The Government has decided, in consultation with 
the United States, that Article IV of the ANZUS 
Treaty applies to the terrorist attacks on the 
United States. The decision is based on our 
belief that the attacks have been initiated and 
coordinated from outside the United States. 
This action has been taken to underline the 
gravity of the situation and to demonstrate our 
steadfast commitment to work with the United 
States in combating international terrorism. 
The Australian Government will be in close 
consultation with the United States 
Administration in the period ahead to consider 
what actions Australia might take in support of 
the US response to these attacks.82 
                     81 Australia Office of the Prime Minister, “Transcript of the Prime 
Minister, the Honourable John Howard MP, Press Conference, Australian Embassy, 
Washington DC”(11 Sep 2001), taken from the Australian Prime Minter’s website 
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2007. 
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 Quoted in its entirety, this is the most significant 
statement in the history of the Alliance in that its 
interpretation of Article IV of the ANZUS treaty was that 
the “Pacific Area” was no longer geographically 
constrained. 
 The RAN immediately became involved in Operation 
Enduring Freedom by continuing to dispatch ships which now 
patrolled not only the Arabian Gulf, but also the Gulf of 
Aden and Indian Ocean, conducting maritime interdiction 
operations to contain terrorist movements and operations.  
To ease the burden on the U.S. Navy throughout the region, 
the RAN created seagoing staffs that would routinely take 
Task Group command of the sea-based sanctions efforts 
beginning in 2001.83 
 Australia and her navy have also contributed 
substantially to the subsequent and ongoing operations in 
Iraq.  During the initial stages of the war, the 
Australians had three ships in the order of battle 
(Kanimbla, Anzac and Darwin) with Captain P. D. Jones and 
his task group staff having responsibility for the multi-
national naval force that would secure the Khawr Abd Allah 
waterway as far north as Umm Qasr, nearly fifty miles 
inland.  The RAN also had deployed Combat Demolition Team 
3.84 
To this day, as America’s unflagging ally, the RAN 
maintains a continuous presence and acts as mission enabler 
in the Arabian Gulf by rotating both ships and staffs 
through theater.  They have been vital to ensuring that the 
maritime environment of Iraqi waters is secure and safe by 
                     83 Greg Nash and Neil Stevens, Australia’s Navy in the Gulf: From 
Countenance to Catalyst, 1941-2006, (Topmill, Silverwater, NSW: 2006), 50-90. 
84 Ibid., 57-71. 
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providing oversight and protection for the safe movement of 
oil from the two sea terminals; suppressing the movements 
of Al Qaeda, insurgents and illicit goods; and helping to 
ensure that the fledgling Iraqi Navy is equipped and 
trained correctly. 
 During this period, the Defense Department also 
invested in the creation of deployable joint staff 
headquarters capable of conducting integrated Australian 
operations.  The command modules will be both land and sea-
based, with the sea-based modules located onboard HMAS 
Kanimbla and Manoora.85 
 In 2000, the Navy also established the Sea Power 
Center to “undertake activities which promote the study, 
discussion and awareness of maritime issues and strategy 
within the RAN and the defense and civil communities at 
large.”86  The Center produces outstanding literature which 
serves the needs of the military well, especially in its 
articulation of service needs to what is commonly viewed by 
Australian maritime writers as a maritime nation with no 
sense of itself. 
The Navy’s stature in the budgeting process would seem 
to be further enhanced by the Defense White Paper Updates 
issued in 2003 and 2005.  These papers both state that for 
the foreseeable future Australia will continue to fight 
alongside the United States against international 
terrorism, both near and far.87  Although all three services 
have benefited from the short-term financial windfall 
                     85 Australia Department of Defense, Defense Capabilities Plan 2006-2016, 99-
100, taken from Australian DOD website 
<http://www.defense.gov.au/dmo/id/dcp/DCP_2006_16.pdf> accessed 23 Feb 2007. 
86 Australia Department of Navy Sea Power Centre website 
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associated with acquiring equipment to fight the GWOT, the 
Navy’s success in obtaining approval to replace their aging 
amphibious lift platforms is particularly noteworthy.88  New 
equipment includes three amphibious dock ships and LCMS.  
Of special significance for the Navy is that in the budget 
process, these vessels are listed as joint procurement 
assets rather than being procured under a navy line item.  
This may provide insulation against the kind of budget 
reductions that occurred in the early 1980s. 
 The Australian long acquisition strategy is 
customarily released as a Defense Capability Plan (DCP).  
It is a simple document that notifies both Parliament and 
Australian industry what, when and how the government plans 
to procure defense equipment.  The 2006 DCP is heavily 
maritime-based, with the Navy providing a lot of the 
flexibility required to bring the other services into the 
fight (principle two), as well as conducting integrated 
coalition operations (principle three).  As occurred a 
generation ago, the Air Force and Navy both need advanced 
and therefore expensive equipment simultaneously.  These 
two services dominate the proposed budget over the next 
decade.  The most expensive and long-lead projects are: 
 
 RAAF 100 Joint Strike Fighters (A$11.5-$15.5 
billion) 
 RAN AEGIS Air Warfare Destroyers (A$4.5-6 
billion) 
 RAAF P-3 replacement or update (A$3.5-4.5 
billion) 
                     88 Grant Holloway, “Big Boost for Australia’s Defense Budget,” (CNN.com, 09 
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 RAN replacement of Navy SUW/USW helicopters 
(A$2.5-3.5 billion) 
 RAA Overlander family of vehicles (A$2-2.5 
billion) 
 RAN amphibious ships (A$1.5-2 billion) 
 RAAF multi-mission UAV (A$1-1.5 billion)89 
 
Overall, the defense budget increase since 9/11 has 
been necessitated by the operational commitments of 
Australia’s military and the procurement plan required to 
meet the principles identified in the government’s military 
strategy.  However, the DCP may not play out as designed. 
Will the plan survive its first contact with reality 
unscathed?  For proponents of expeditionary naval power, 
the land-based Joint Strike Fighter is the elephant in the 
room, whose effect remains to be seen.  Since the current 
Navy plan is not nearly as audacious as the one proposed 
following the end of the Vietnam War, it may be less likely 
to become bogged down by either inter- or intra-service 
competition.  However, despite the budgeting process being 
a truly joint exercise that minimizes inter-service 
competition, the plan may suffer from the same flaw which 
has ultimately hampered all previous Navy efforts to 
modernize – Australia’s year-to-year defense budget 
allocation.   
First and foremost, operational deployments are 
expensive materially and also arduous for service members.  
Given the number of commitments and the small size of the 
                     89 Australia Department of Defense, Defense Capabilities Plan 2006-2016, 
141, taken from Australian DOD website 
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Australian military, it is likely that reconstitution of 
these resources, machine and human alike, will cost more 
than predicted, leading to a strain on the acquisition 
budget.   
More importantly, the current budget is similar in 
form to the one proposed following the reheating of the 
Cold War in Asia in the late 1970s.  This somewhat pie-in-
the-sky proposal depicts all service acquisition budgets 
increasing nearly simultaneously,90 leading to a total 
budget which will most likely grow each year for much of 
the next decade if Canberra stays in the GWOT.  The numbers 
seem impractical, if not downright implausible, given 
previous history.  It is unlikely that Australia’s economy 
will grow sufficiently for the same percentage of GDP to 
cover burgeoning defense costs.  Also, the defense budget 
will undoubtedly reflect the ebb and flow of the politics 
of anti-terrorism which will most likely mimic domestic 
political trends in the United States, as happened during 
the Vietnam era.  Displeasure is growing in both nations 
over the war in Iraq and the continued lack of stability in 
Afghanistan.91  Admittedly, this discomfiture is more 
dramatic in the United States; but if opposition in the 
lead nation continues to grow, its allies could jump off 
the bandwagon as quickly as they jumped on it.  The 2007 
Ministerial election in Australia and, more importantly, 
the 2008 Presidential election in the United States will 
likely define the future of both countries’ involvement in 
                     90 Australia Department of Defense, Defense Capabilities Plan 2006-2016, 5-
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the Global War on Terrorism, particularly as regards regime 
change and the democratization of other nations. 
The preeminent influence on any defense budge is the 
state of the current economy, which in Australia has been 
relatively strong, stable and resilient since the early 
1990s.  The government has been running minor surpluses, 
and foreign debt is completely in the private sector.  It 
is unknown how long government fiscal policy can fend of a 
recession, but the government is working hard to expand 
trade agreements to keep its foreign markets growing.  Of 
greater concern is the projected growth of social and 
healthcare costs as the labor force shrinks and the 
population ages.  Social spending will likely put 
significant restraints on other areas of spending, such as 
defense.92   
The future course of the RAN is necessarily uncertain; 
but it is likely that the service will not acquire every 
capability for which it is currently slated, despite its 
vital role in the joint vision of the Australian way of 
war.  Canberra’s defense acquisition process may present a 
no-win situation:  If Australia’s military operations 
continue at the present pace, it is difficult to believe 
there will be enough money to pay for the planed new 
technology.  If, however, Australia takes a step back from 
its current commitments overseas, the impetus to invest in 
additional defense capability may wane.   
Today the RAN has re-emerged, following the rather 
distant and bleak days of self-reliance, as a key player in 
Australia’s new strategy – a truly maritime one – which has 
                     92 David Gruen and Amanda Sayegh, “The Evolution of Fiscal Policy in 
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embraced once more the concept of forward defense.  If the 
three principles described in the 2000 Defense White Paper 
survive the coming political process, and if most of the 
acquisition plan remains in place, the Royal Australian 





























V. THE RISE OF SOFT POWER AND THE REGION’S NEXT 
HEGEMON: THE LAST DECADE 
Australia’s foreign policy toward China over the last 
ten years is one which demonstrates the use of bilateral 
and selected recent multilateral efforts to achieve 
success.  In many ways Canberra is an ideal economic 
partner for Beijing.  The government of Australia currently 
sees itself as a medium power that desires to deal with 
other governments and supra-national bodies as 
independently as possible.  The primary focus of Canberra’s 
foreign policy has been to ensure regional stability.  They 
are allied with the United States, which worries Beijing; 
but this is currently offset by the significant number of 
political and economic ties shared by Canberra and Beijing.  
The relationship between China and Australia is likely to 
continue to grow for the foreseeable future despite 
Australia’s traditional alliance with the United States. 
 Before pressing into the nature of the Canberra-
Beijing relationship, a brief discussion of how Australia 
moved to the point of mutual cooperation with China is in 
order.   
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, two significant 
strategic events forced Australia to adopt a new foreign 
policy.  The first event was Britain’s pragmatic 1967 
decision to withdraw its forward-deployed military forces 
in Asia.  The Australians had been concerned about this 
eventuality for some time and events like the United States 
forcing an end to British-French intervention in Egypt 
during the 1954 Suez Crisis highlighted this concern.  
Britain’s Asia pullout was completed in 1969.  The second 
event was the issuance of the Guam (or Nixon) Doctrine, 
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also in 1969, which raised questions about the resolve of 
the United States to continue to its involvement in 
stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region.   
These events stimulated the opening of a dialogue 
toward a more cordial relationship with Beijing which 
resulted in the establishment of diplomatic relations in 
December 1972, just over six years before Washington 
established formal relations with Beijing.  Since that 
time, Australia’s foreign policy has steered a course 
between safeguarding its own vital interests and 
maintaining alliance with the United States, both during 
the bipolar world period between 1970 and 1991 and also in 
the post-Cold-War era, when the U.S. became the sole 
superpower. 
 Since the early 1970s Australia and China have enjoyed 
increasing economic coordination, which has greatly 
expanded since China’s began its steady market reforms in 
1978.  This increased trade was also brought about not just 
by the previously noted Guam Doctrine, but also by London’s 
failed attempt to join the European Economic Community 
(EEC) in 1961 and its eventual integration into the 
European Union (EU) in 1973.93  The United States was fully 
supportive of the EEC and EU since they were seen as 
continuing to strengthen Europe against Soviet aggression.  
Australia, however, was very concerned about the possible 
negative impact of European economic unity on the 
traditional commonwealth trading block.94 
Canberra has promoted strengthening economic and, more 
recently, other relations with Beijing.  Australia has 
                     93 European Union website <http://europa.eu.int/> accessed 12 Dec 2005. 
94 Current Notes in International Affairs, vol. 33, 1962, 51-53, cited in 
Glen St. James Barclay and, Joseph M. Siracusa, Australian-American Relations 
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often successfully dealt bilaterally with China on trade 
issues, and economic relationships have blossomed at both 
the national and regional government levels in both 
nations.  These efforts have promoted Australia to China’s 
eighth largest trading partner overall, and China’s “third 
largest merchandise trading partner, export market and 
source of imports, with two-way trade in 2003 worth more 
than A$23 billion (US$16 billion).”95 
  Trade between the two nations is growing rapidly and 
is noted with satisfaction by each country’s executives and 
their spokesmen at press conferences.  On April 19, 2005, a 
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman noted: 
In recent years, the momentum of development in 
relations between China and Australia has been 
very good. Trade between the two countries 
exceeded $20 billion last year, up 50 percent 
from the year before. The rate of increase is 
quite significant. Establishing a free trade area 
is the common desire of both sides. Both sides 
believe that establishing a free trade area is an 
equal, mutually beneficial, and reciprocal 
economic and trade arrangement, which will better 
promote economic and trade cooperation between 
the two countries.96 
 Discussions are currently underway for the creation of 
a free trade agreement (FTA) between the two nations.  The 
establishment of such an agreement is important to both 
governments, as it would ensure continued economic 
stability and growth.  Australia views an FTA as helping to 
stabilize modern China.  Beijing understands that an FTA 
                     95 Beijing China Daily (Internet Version-WWW) in English 17 Aug 
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would be a significant milestone for its economic policy -- 
the first entered into by China.  Beijing also views 
Australia as an important country in the region and the 
only Western nation whose foreign policy is sufficiently 
independent to work bilaterally this type of issue.97 
 China’s desire to integrate fully into the Western 
economy, coupled with Australia’s desire for continued 
regional stability and economic prosperity, prompted 
Canberra to back Beijing’s bid to enter the World Trade 
Organization.  The two governments worked bilaterally in 
1999 to reach agreement on the principles which would allow 
Australia to support China’s entry, which came in 2001. 
 The trade occurring between the Australia and China is 
quite complimentary; both governments are willing to set 
aside differences to work toward a common vision of 
prosperity.  Australia’s leading imports from China include 
finished textiles, electronics and machinery, chemicals, 
and consumer products; China receives wheat, iron ore, oil, 
natural resources and nonferrous metals.  The trend is 
expected to continue.  China’s media has noted that Beijing 
has increased its wheat imports from Australia (1 million 
tons in 2004).98  China will, no doubt, continue to purchase 
increasing amounts of wheat as it is unable to provide 
sufficient amounts for domestic consumption.  As an example 
of Beijing’s willingness to embrace the free market, in 
2005 the Chinese steel industry was stung by a 71.5 percent 
rise in the cost of iron ore from Australian and Brazilian 
producers. The Chinese government did not become involved, 
                     97 There is too much political friction between the United States and China.  
Western Europe is tied to unification and expansion under the umbrella of the 
EU.  Canada does most of its economic dealings with the United States. 
98 Beijing China Daily (Business Weekly Supplement) (Internet Version-WWW) 
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<www.opensource.gov>, accessed 30 Nov 2005. 
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preferring to let market forces settle the issue, a 
significant milestone in Chinese laissez-faire economics.99 
 Politically, both countries desire regional stability 
and seek appropriate multilateral frameworks and 
organizations to meet this end.  Both have integrated into 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization – 
an organization whose economic goals can sometimes 
transcend traditional political boundaries.  Additionally, 
Beijing and Canberra are both dialogue members of the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF), where both hope to influence the 
countries of Southeast Asia.  However, since ASEAN guides 
this multi-lateral forum to its own end, the common 
understanding between Beijing and Canberra could be, and 
has been, under stress. 
During 2005, the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
and has been the source of tension between Beijing and 
Canberra.  Australia at first intended not to sign the 
pact, which China has already signed.  Prime Minister 
Howard cited self-defense as the primary reason.  This is 
much in line with President Bush’s concept of pre-emptive 
war, which Australia supported by virtue of its 
participation in the 2003 war in Iraq.  In July 2005, 
Australia agreed to sign the pact using the rationale that 
ASEAN would offer Australia a seat at the December East 
Asia Summit.  However, Mr. Howard stated that pre-emptive 
strike remains an option for the national military strategy 
against terrorists operating in other countries which pose 
an immediate threat to Australia.  This has drawn  
 
 
                     99 Liaoning Ribao (Internet Version-WWW) on 19 June 05 taken from Opensource 
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significant recent criticism from Beijing, who 
unequivocally stated that Canberra is upholding an immoral 
doctrine.100  
The Australian Air Force maintains a squadron of F-111 
bombers with precision-guided munitions.  They are the only 
medium strike aircraft owned by an Asia-Pacific nation and 
pose a legitimate strike threat to other countries in the 
region.  The same could be argued for the limited power 
projection capability maintained by the Australian Army and 
Navy.  Their capabilities, though small by United States 
standards, are significant compared to those of most other 
regional countries (China, Japan, and India being the 
exceptions). 
Both Australia and China also use United Nations to 
influence regional stability, and both have been active in 
stabilization efforts in East Timor.  Australia took the 
lead role in this UN mission following the United States 
refusal to become involved militarily.  China is also 
provided 69 police officers as peacekeepers to the 
mission.101  Sending peacekeepers on UN missions is not 
historically common for China since traditionally these 
operations were viewed as interference in other countries 
internal problems.102  Peacekeeping operations in East Timor 
may signal a change in Beijing’s previous policy of non-
involvement in regional stability matters, a change which  
 
                     100 Hong Kong South China Morning Post (Internet Version-WWW) in English 28 
Jul 05, "Strike-First policy Irresponsible," taken from Opensource Center 
website <www.opensource.gov>, accessed 30 Nov 2005. 
101 United Nations Depart. of Peacekeeping Operations website 
<www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2002/May2002_3.pdf> accessed on 8 
Dec 2005. 
102 Hong Kong South China Morning Post (Internet Version-WWW) in English 21 
Aug 02 13, "Welcome Peace Drive” taken from Opensource Center website 
<www.opensource.gov>, accessed 30 Nov 2005. 
63 
would be welcomed by Canberra as a sign of China’s growing 
recognition of its own regional responsibility and maturity 
in foreign affairs. 
 Australia and China have also been constructive and 
appreciative of each other in their attempts to bring 
stability to the Korean peninsula in light of North Korea’s 
continuing threat of nuclear blackmail.  As part of its 
effort to establish regional stability, Australia 
established diplomatic relations with the DPRK in 2000 
after a 25 year hiatus.103  In January 2003, Australian 
diplomats traveled to Pyongyang in an attempt to negotiate 
an end to the stalemate regarding Kim Jong Il’s demand for 
bilateral negotiations with the United States.  The effort 
was welcomed by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs as 
constructive diplomacy in a serious matter.104  Likewise, 
Prime Minister Howard has voiced praise for China’s 
involvement in the three- and six-party talks.105   
 In contrast to President Bush’s growing military and 
moral support of the regime in Taipei, a concern to 
Beijing, Australia has been unwavering in its support of a 
“one China” policy since establishing diplomatic relations 
with the PRC.  As an example, Canberra warned Papua New 
Guinea of “the negative political and social implications 
after the latter established ’diplomatic relations’ with 
                     103 Australian Government Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade website 
<www.dfat.gov.au/geo/dprk/dprk_brief.html#_Chronology_of_Key_Developments%20in%
20A> accessed on 5 Dec 2005. 
104 Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese 22 Aug 03 taken from 
Opensource Center website <www.opensource.gov>, accessed 30 Nov 2005. 
105 Meng Yan and Shao Zongwei, "Leaders Meet Howard,” in Beijing China Daily 
(Internet Version-WWW) in English 0030 GMT 19 Aug 03, China Daily Staff from 
the "Top News" page: taken from Opensource Center website <www.opensource.gov>, 
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Taiwan” in 1999.106   An April 2005 an Australian poll by 
the Lowy Institute indicated that Australians desire not to 
choose sides should a cross-strait war break out with the 
United States supporting the Republic of China.107  Last 
year’s passing of Beijing’s anti-secession law, which 
formalized Beijing’s options (including military) should 
Taiwan declare its independence, was only lightly 
criticized in Canberra, but the commentary focused on the 
continued peaceful resolution of the cross-strait crisis.108  
Australia, like much of the developed world, has 
strong economic ties with Taiwan, although not diplomatic 
relations.  Taiwan is Australia’s eighth largest trading 
partner, with trade similar to that with the PRC in terms 
of types of goods imported and exported between the two 
nations, but at about a quarter of the monetary value of 
the trade relationship that currently exists between the 
PRC and Australia.109  In short, peaceful resolution would 
allow continued political and economic stability for both 
Canberra and Beijing.  Canberra would most likely neither 
commit to nor support military action should Washington 
determine intervention to be necessary, despite the 
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unwritten policy since the first Taiwan Strait Crisis in 
1954, and would most certainly be true if the United States 
were seen as the aggressor.110 
 Beijing has also used non-traditional diplomatic 
measures to ensure continued successful relations with 
Australia and to balance regional power against the United 
States and other competing interests.  Chinese officials 
have noted the success of people-to-people exchanges in 
news briefings.  These include city-to-city cultural 
exchanges, Model United Nations delegations, and collegiate 
student exchanges.  After the outbreak of SARS in China, 
Chinese media noted, with approval, that Canberra planned 
no interruption in educational services out of fear of 
contagion.111  During 2003, Chinese student applications 
actually increased and could be attributable in part to the 
policy taken in regards to the SAR outbreak and the 
flexibility of Australia’s educational system.112  It might, 
therefore, be expected that Australia will be less 
emotional than other countries about a possible pandemic of 
avian bird flu, and will likely be among the first to offer 
assistance to China to maintain control. 
 In the area of socio-economic growth, Beijing has 
viewed Canberra’s model socialist healthcare network in an 
open and engaged way.  Beijing sent a government working 
group to Australia in January 2003 to study Australia’s 
                     110 Jacob Bercovich, The Evolution of ANZUS in ANZUS in Crisis:  Alliance 
Management in International Affairs, (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1988), 34-
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2005. 
66 
successful retirement and social welfare system.113  This 
effort, like the others, reflects the continued deep 
bilateral relations between the two nations, as well as an 
indication of the commitment of Chinese officials as they 
consider how the needs of their large, aging population 
over the next century. 
In defense matters, Canberra has worked bilaterally 
with Beijing on military-to-military relations, with a 
number of high level exchanges occurring during the last 
decade including the aforementioned coordination efforts in 
East Timor.  Ongoing exchanges have also occurred and 
continue to occur at lower levels in the chains of command; 
Beijing desires to continue and increase the frequency and 
reach of bilateral military relations.  Currently, China’s 
and Australia’s spheres of influence overlap in the South 
China Sea.  Military relations will become increasingly 
important as both countries modernize and expand the scope 
of their operations in the region.  Chinese maritime 
strategy already reflects a desire to project military 
power to the first island chain and eventually the second.  
Australia’s Parliament has been considering shifting to a 
more assertive and active maritime strategy and a more 
aggressive procurement schedule, which is reflective of the 
enhanced role it has taken in regional and world affairs 
since 9/11.  Australia has been focusing on changing the 
traditional doctrine of its military defense.  This change 
would include an expanded and more independent role in the 
Asia-Pacific region and further integration and support for 
vital interests outside the region, accomplished by 
                     113 Zi Mi, "Oz Shares Social Security Experience,” in Beijing China Daily 
(Internet Version-WWW) in English 0409 GMT 25 Jan 03, from the "Home News" 
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expanding the already close alliance with the United States 
in the Global War on Terrorism.114  Beijing looks with 
disfavor on Canberra maintaining too close an alliance with 
the United States, both within and outside the region. 
The relationship between Canberra and Washington 
recently strengthened since the beginning of the Global War 
on Terrorism, which vexes Beijing.  Even before 9/11, 
Beijing’s rhetoric warned of the creation of an “Asian 
NATO” anchored by Japan in the north and Australia in the 
south and containing South Korea, the Philippines, and 
Taiwan.115  Beijing’s complaints regarding United States 
containment foster China’s image as a repressed underdog.  
Beijing combats perceived U.S. encroachment through 
bilateral relations with other nations in an attempt to 
balance this supposed challenge to its sovereignty.  In its 
relations with Australia, Beijing depends upon both 
Canberra’s reasonableness and Australia’s desire to control 
its own destiny within the region.  Beijing does not 
condemn the ANZUS treaty provided it remains a purely 
bilateral agreement.116  With this in mind, China hopes to 
move Australia into a position to balance or limit United 
States influence in the area. 
Beijing has also dealt bilaterally with Canberra on 
human rights issues.  Canberra, like other Western 
countries, has questioned the treatment of Chinese people 
by their government, particularly following the Tiananmen                      114 Alex Tewes, Laura Rayner, Kelly Kavanaugh, Australia’s Maritime Strategy 
in the 21st Century, Parliamentary Research Brief no. 4, 2004-05, Australian 
Government, Parliament of Australia Library. 
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Square massacre.  However, since 1998 the two governments 
have held annual talks on human rights sponsored by the 
Australian government's Human Rights and Technical Co-
Operation Program with China (HRTC), which allows sensitive 
dialogue to occur between the governments without upsetting 
the overall relationship.117  Australia can appear to help 
China become more Western in regard to human rights, while 
China allows minimal official criticism and intrusion into 
an internal issue. 
The two governments also share a common concern over 
the plight of ethnic groups (including Chinese) living in 
other countries.  Neither government desires the economic 
and political fallout of a refugee situation resulting from 
the repression of ethnic minorities in Southeast Asian 
nations.  East Timor is an example of how both governments 
will likely work together in the future to prevent such 
occurrences. 
 The overarching trend in this relationship is one in 
which both Canberra and Beijing solidified a relationship 
mutually beneficial to each other.  Only recently have 
Australian Parliamentarians questioned started to question 
how much soft power the Chinese have accrued in the 
region.118 But, Australia’s economic future is in Asia and, 
as in previous decades that future cannot afford to be 
interrupted by an arms buildup meant to deter an expanding 
Chinese Navy.  Given Washington’s longstanding political-
military stance in Southeast Asia and Canberra’s lack of 
resources and inability to stand up to  its vastly more 
                     117 "Model Forum Promotes Human Rights” in Hong Kong South China Morning 
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powerful Chinese neighbor, Canberra has little choice but 
to continue to wield soft power as well as she can and rely 
on the remaining superpower to achieve militarily what she 
cannot.  If Washington were to pull back from the region in 
the future, necessity would dictate an even closer 

























The roots and evolution of the RAN have been guided 
largely by two strategic goals: to protect the homeland and 
to integrate with the United States Navy; and also by 
constraints imposed by a variety of domestic factors.  
Historically, this set of circumstances has resulted in the 
creation and re-creation of a competent and increasingly 
modern RAN.  Innovation has been somewhat limited in scope, 
however, falling short of the aspirations of Navy 
leadership.   
Australia’s high-end naval forces have consistently 
moved toward integrating and operating with the United 
States Navy.  At the same time, however, the RAN must 
maintain its ability to protect the homeland against a 
variety of regional threats, a need that the United States 
cannot be relied upon to satisfy.   
These competing considerations, as well as others more 
secondary in nature, have guided the direction of the RAN 
for the past 60 years, a direction not likely to change 
significantly in the foreseeable future unless the United 
States loses, or abandons, its currently preponderant role 
in the Asia-Pacific region.  The RAN will continue its 
modernization, and its mission effectiveness can be 
expected to increase because of continued technological 
progress.   
U.S. policymakers and maritime strategists recognize 
the importance of our relationship with the Government of 
Australia.  The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review noted that 
Australia is one of our two most important allies in the 
72 
Global War on Terrorism.  Since 9/11, the relationship 
between these ANZUS allies has dramatically improved, a 
significant fact given that the United States Navy plays a 
major role in executing Washington’s security strategy in 
the Pacific theater and that the RAN is a vital ally in 
securing our mutual interests in Southeast Asia.  Evidence 
of the strength of the relationship was provided when the 
Australian Parliament declared 9/11 to be an attack on the 
ANZUS alliance.  Since that time, the RAN has been active 
in its support of U.S. strategy in the Middle East, both as 
a force provider and as a task group commander. 
Since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism, 
the Australian Defense Force (including the Navy) has 
accelerated its acquisition programs to support deployments 
and has begun considering changes both in force structure 
and in policies.  For example, the recent assertion by 
Prime Minister Howard that Australia is responsible for 
policing an “arc of instability” which extends from East 
Timor into the Pacific Islands may have significant impact 
on future missions for the RAN,119 although one must 
remember that this policy has been articulated many times 
since the creation of ANZUS. 
Understanding the dynamics of the RAN’s history can 
help the United States Navy and the its government 
formulate a maritime policy that not only serves the 
national interests of the United States but is also 
inclusive of the needs and capabilities of the Royal 
Australian Navy.  It would, in particular, be a mistake to 
assume that the Australian Navy has embarked on a new path 
since 9/11, or that its current direction is not subject to 
                     119 Sydney ABC Radio National WWW-Audio in English 0700 GMT 08 Aug 06 taken 
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change in response to events to which Australia may weight 
differently from the United States.  Washington and 
Canberra will need to remain cognizant of each other’s 
vital interests while pursuing common goals through mutual 
support and coordination.  In that regard, a careful look 
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